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"Down went the owners - greedy men whom hope of gain allured:
Oh, dry the starting tear, for they were heavily insured."
W. S. Gilbert, The 'Bab' Ballads, "Etiquette" (1871).
I. INTRODUCTION
Both legal experts and lay people share a common understanding
of the concept of fraud.' Presumably, they agree that law should
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Legal Studies, Graduate School of Business,
University of Florida. B.A., University of the South (Sewanee), 1978; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1982. The author very much appreciates the editorial suggestions furnished to him by
Professor David J. Nye during the Automobile Insurance Fraud Study (1991) conducted by
the Florida Insurance Research Center, University of Florida. Professor Nye and the author
were two of the four faculty members working on that study. The author also expresses his
appreciation to Walter Dartland, Executive Director of Citizens' Fraud Prevention and
Education Foundation, and Sam Miller, Executive Director of Florida Insurance News
Service. The interpretations contained in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of these acknowledged individuals or organizations.
1. This article uses the term "fraud" much the same way lay persons and lawyers use it.
See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 490 (1988) (defining fraud as
the "intentional perversion of truth in order to induce another to part with something of value
or to surrender a legal right"); FLA. STAT. ch. 817.234(l)(A)(1) (1991) (defining a fraudulent
insurance claim as involving "intent to injure, defraud, or deceive" an insurer with a statement
that contains "false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing
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serve to prevent, curtail, compensate for, or punish fraud. The crea-
tion of the law via statutes and judicial opinions, as well as its imple-
mentation through lawsuits and criminal prosecutions, is intended to
advance these goals. An essential premise in the law of fraud is that
people who commit fraud willfully violate well-established legal and
moral values. Fraud is more than just a typical civil wrong,2 such as a
breach of contract or the tort of negligence, because it involves inten-
tional, dishonest behavior3 and often is also a crime. Therefore, civil
fraud law goes beyond determining liability and providing restitution
to wrongfully injured parties; it ventures into issues more typically
found in criminal law: deterrence and punishment. As with other
types of intentional torts, the tortfeasor who commits fraud must dis-
gorge ill-gotten gains or otherwise restore the status quo ante. More-
over, the misconduct should lead, whenever appropriate, to an award
of exemplary (punitive) damages in addition to the compensatory
award.
However, such an understanding of the law of fraud, and of its
goals, finds little expression in practice. This is particularly true for
areas like insurance claims fraud, where theory is not nearly as con-
troversial as the practical concerns of prevention and detection.
Indeed, case law and statutory reform could serve to reduce incentives
for insurance claims fraud, increase the chances to detect it, and
strengthen the level of punishment. However, the players in the sys-
tem - the insurers' counsel, defense attorneys, plaintiffs' lawyers,
claims personnel, Department of Insurance fraud investigators, and
insurance fraud prosecutors4 - could still hinder progress.
material to [a] claim"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.991(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (defining a
fraudulent insurance act as "knowingly and with intent to defraud present[ing to] an insurer
... any written statement as part of, or in support of,... a claim for payment or other benefit
pursuant to an insurance policy... which [the presenting party] knows to contain materially
false information"); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:33A-4(a)(l) (1985) (defining an insurance fraud
violation as presenting "any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of or opposition
to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that the
statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material
to the claim").
Both at law and in lay terms the definition of fraud encompasses broad concepts such as
deceit, trickery, and cheating. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979); 6 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 152 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 762 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 555 (2d ed. 1984). Fraud is thus not a technical term, but a basic concept
generally understood by most people.
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 27 ("Actionable fraud"), 223 ("Civil fraud"), 594-95
("Fraud") (5th ed. 1979).
3. See id. at 594 (stating that fraud is "[a]n intentional perversion of the truth").
4. All these players have been surveyed, and their responses have been incorporated into
this article. For discussion of public attitudes-the views of insurance consumers-see
[V/ol. 46:907
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This article discusses one type of fraudulent activity: automobile
insurance claims fraud.5 It grows out of a study performed at the
University of Florida's Insurance Research Center. While the study
specifically focused on the state of Florida, its findings and conclu-
sions are applicable to auto insurance fraud nationwide, and even to
insurance fraud generally.6
The article first discusses types of automobile insurance fraud
and relevant statutes and cases. It shows that claimants have strong
economic incentives to pad their auto insurance claims or even to file
completely fictitious claims. Inflation of damages, we see, may at
times be an accepted negotiating tactic, particularly with respect to
uninsured motorist and bodily injury liability. Yet, these exaggera-
FLORIDA INS. RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
FRAUD STUDY 72-111 (1991) [hereinafter AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY]. Complete copies of the
study, including a closed-claims analysis, the public poll, and appendices containing the
surveys and complete tabulations of responses, are on file with the author and the Insurance
Research Center, College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville,
Florida.
5. The California legislature declared as follows in 1989 Cal. Stat., c. 1119, § 3 (codified
at CAL. INS. CODE § 1871(b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added)):
[I]nsurance fraud is a particular problem for automobile policyholders;
fraudulent activities account for 15 to 20 percent of all auto insurance payments.
Automobile insurance fraud is the biggest and fastest growing segment of
insurance fraud and contributes substantially to the high cost of automobile
insurance with particular significance in urban areas.
See infra notes 24-25, 29-30 and accompanying text.
While this article focuses on fraud by claimants, the author recognizes that insurers are
not blameless; they, too, can cheat. Insurers may defraud their policyholders in any number of
ways, such as materially altering the risk of the firm after the contract has been formed and
purposely delaying or denying altogether the payment of legitimate claims. However, competi-
tive markets and vigilant regulation discourage systematic actions of this type. For recent
examples of fraud within insurance companies, see Jon E. Crosby, Insider Frauds, FLA.
UNDERWRITER, Apr. 1990, at 10; Laura Mazzuca, License to Steal, Bus. INS., Jan. 2, 1989,
AGENT/BROKER TOPICS, at 34A; Douglas McLeod, Former Insurer Exec Faces New Indict-
ment for Fraud, Bus. INS., May 4, 1987, AGENT/BROKER TOPICS, at 2; Phil Zinkewicz, In
Search of a Better Mousetrap: Insurance Fraud, 1 INS. REV. 36 (Feb. 1989); Dept. of Insur-
ance: Gallagher Fines Nine Insurance Companies $30,000, Bus. WIRE, May 18, 1989, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire file; see also infra note 45.
6. All forms of insurance create moral hazards between insureds and their insurers.
Insureds have an incentive to minimize their premium and to maximize the benefits received
per premium dollar spent. Insurance, in short, tends (1) to attract purchasers who have reason
to know they are more vulnerable to an insured risk than the general population (adverse
selection), and (2) to reduce the insureds' incentives to behave honestly and to take precautions
against covered risks (moral hazard). See LEWIS E. DAVIDS, DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE 17-
18, 304 (7th rev. ed. 1990) (defining "adverse selection" and "moral hazard"). Therefore,
insurers establish underwriting procedures, design their contracts, and adjust claims in such a
manner as to protect themselves against policyholder dishonesty. For a more comprehensive
examination of this subject, see CAROL ANNE HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL
ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985); NEIL A.
DOHERTY, CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A FINANCIAL EXPOSITION 20 (1985).
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tions may constitute misrepresentations,7 and they often escape the
attention of claims personnel. In other words, the economic disincen-
tives to commit fraud, such as the risk of getting caught, are usually
small.
The article next reviews countermeasures against fraud, includ-
ing both state and private enforcement efforts. It shows that fraud is
inadequately detected, insufficiently reported, lackadaisically prose-
cuted, and lightly punished.' While economic crime specialists zeal-
ously pursue prosecution, such expertise remains rare and white-
collar crime prosecutorial units are few in number. Most prosecutors
lack the experience, knowledge, or interest to prosecute cases of insur-
ance fraud aggressively. When there are convictions, effective alterna-
tive sentencing must be available, given the practical restrictions of
overcrowded jails.
Lastly, the article analyzes survey responses from claims person-
nel, defense attorneys, plaintiffs' attorneys, insurers' in-house counsel,
prosecutors, and governmental investigators of fraud. As one might
expect, claims personnel and plaintiffs' attorneys often oppose each
other systematically, not just on individual cases. The survey
responses, however, point to some surprising areas of agreement.
Common interests of these two key groups in the insurance process
could be a basis for budgetary, legislative, and educational reforms
designed to combat automobile insurance fraud.
II. PURPOSE, METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
The purpose of polling claims personnel, defense attorneys,
plaintiffs' attorneys, fraud investigators, prosecutors, and insurers' in-
house counsel was to develop information about these groups' esti-
mates and attitudes on claims fraud and potentially related issues.9 It
makes sense to study automobile insurance fraud by ascertaining the
7. If an exaggeration is a statement of fact rather than an opinion as to value, it may
constitute a fraudulent act. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979) (defining
fraud as "[a] false representation of a matter of fact").
8. Even if erroneous, a perception of laxity on the part of the insurance industry can
encourage would-be defrauders to engage in misrepresentation. See infra Appendix, Table 12
(showing that almost one-third of respondents with an opinion wrote that fraud cases go
unreported because the insurers believe the government does not pursue these cases.
Furthermore, almost one-eighth of the respondents wrote that the government lacks the
resources required to pursue insurance fraud cases).
9. All of the questionnaires were to be returned by the respondents directly to the Florida
Insurance Research Center, University of Florida. The questionnaires gave the respondents
the option to furnish their names and telephone numbers, but assured them complete
confidentiality. The names and numbers were requested in case the research center needed to
contact the participants.
[Vol. 46:907
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actions, attitudes and perceptions of these practitioners, because
improvement of fraud law must come in the form of prevention,
detection, and punishment, not in reformulation of longstanding legal
principles. 10
The surveys were designed in close consultation with several
experts in automobile insurance matters, including representatives
from each of the groups surveyed. In addition to multiple choice
responses, the surveys asked for and received written comments and
open-ended responses. The author interviewed numerous key partici-
pants in the fight against insurance fraud, most notably investigators
and prosecutors.
The claims personnel survey was sent to the approximately 160
insurance companies licensed to provide auto insurance in Florida.
Each insurer was asked to randomly select twenty percent of its
claims adjusting work force to complete the survey. Four hundred of
Florida's 4,623 licensed insurance company adjusters returned
questionnaires. 1
In order to survey attorneys with experience in auto insurance
claims, the author obtained current mailing lists from two groups:
the Florida Defense Bar, and the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
The defense bar list contained approximately 800 names, and each
person received a survey. The Academy list contained about four
times as many names, which were randomly sampled so that an equal
number of plaintiffs' attorneys and defense attorneys would receive
the surveys. Two hundred thirty-four defense attorneys and 177
plaintiffs' attorneys completed and returned the survey.' 2
These surveys, as well as those of in-house counsel,' 3 prosecu-
tors,' 4 and investigators,'" were completed from late April to late July
1990. Each survey expressly guaranteed confidentiality to the respon-
10. As previously stated, there is less controversy regarding the theory of fraud law than
there is concerning the law's application. See supra text accompanying note 4.
11. Telephone Interviews with John Derby & Don Powers, Florida Department of
Insurance, Bureau of Agent and Agency Licensing (Nov. 14, 1990) (figure of 4,623 adjusters is
as of July 31, 1990). The 400 represent 8.7% of Florida's adjusters. The response by exactly
400 adjusters means that with at least 95% probability their collective responses to each
question coincide with the views of the total population of adjusters, subject to a margin of
error of less than 5%.
12. For statistical purposes, we can assert the following with at least 95% probability: The
collective responses to each question asked of the defense lawyer sample coincide with the
views of the total defense lawyer population, with a margin of error of less than 6%; the
collective responses to each question asked of the plaintiffs' lawyer sample coincide with the
views of the total plaintiffs' lawyer population, with a margin of error of less than 7%.
13. AUTo INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 119-20.
14. Id. at 120.
15. Id.
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dents. Also, each survey instructed the individual respondent to mail
the completed survey directly to the University of Florida's Insurance
Research Center. These safeguards enabled the respondents to
answer independently and without pressure from their employers, cli-
ents, or governmental superiors.
III. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE FRAUD
A. The Problem in General: Condoning Attitudes, Fraudulent
Acts, Poor Responses, and Miscreant Professionals
A significant part of the general public distrusts and dislikes the
insurance industry.16 Many consumers believe that they benefit from
their policies only if and when they collect on an insurance claim.' 7
Perhaps as a result, they may consider it acceptable to inflate legiti-
mate claims and even to file for fictitious losses.18 From their view-
16. For example, in a random telephone survey of 614 Florida households in February
1990 by the University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research, 23% of the
respondents believed that insurance companies are dishonest, make alarmingly high profits, or
fit both categories. (A complete description and analysis of that public survey is found in
AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 72-111.) Insurance officials concede that they have
a "very, very poor" public image and that people view insurers as "big fat cats." Michael
Allen, More Car Owners Are Scheming to Cheat Insurance Companies as Economy Falters,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1990, at BI (quoting American Insurance Association Vice-President
Janet Bachman).
In their individual dealings with insurers and adjusters, however, the public may generally
be quite satisfied. Wallace R. Hanson, Claims Adjusters Take Unwarranted Abuse, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED., Oct. 2, 1989, at 24 (citing a
Consumer Reports survey in which 221,000 readers who had filed auto insurance claims
within the last three years responded; approximately 60% stated that they were "completely
satisfied" with the way their claim was handled, and about another 30% were either "very
satisfied" or "fairly well satisfied"; only 10% chose one of the negative answers - "somewhat
dissatisfied," "very dissatisfied," or "completely dissatisfied"). A much smaller, but perhaps
more representative, sample of the American people (i.e., a group not limited to Consumer
Reports readers) consisted of 1,448 persons age 18 and over, chosen randomly. That poll
found 74% satisfied with how their insurer handled a recent home insurance claim. Id.
17. Allen, supra note 16 (noting that in 1981 and 1989 polls, 20% and 25% of the
respondents, respectively, agreed that, "[i]t's all right to increase the amount of your insurance
claim.., to make up for the insurance premiums you paid when you had no claims"). The
real value of insurance policies lies in their shifting of risk from the insured to the insurer; that
value does not depend on actual losses or pay-outs.
18. See also AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 72-111. Fourteen percent of the
respondents openly stated that policyholders deserve the money they collect through false
claims. About 24% excused such fraud on the grounds that policyholders need the money.
Eighty-five percent of the respondents would defraud an insurance company for $500 or more
absent any risk of getting caught. Id. at 82-83. The actions condoned by large numbers of the
surveyed consumers include exaggerating medical expenses to increase one's settlement for
pain and suffering (37%), inflating the repair bill estimates (38%), concealing traffic tickets
and accidents on insurance applications in order to lower the premiums (37%), pretending
that the insured automobile was stolen (17%), and staging accidents (15%). Id. at 99 (table) &
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point, such fraud only cuts into insurers' excessive profits.19 They
ignore, however, the real problem: Because premium increases partly
incorporate fraud costs, insurance fraud hurts all policyholders, not
just insurers. Also, the possibility of fraud causes distrust between
insurer and insured and thus may poison the claims process even
when both sides try to be fair. Finally, the impact of insurance fraud
extends beyond a business' or consumer's "bottom line." Although
thought of as a non-violent, economic crime, insurance fraud can lead
to, or be part of, unlawful violent activities.2°
The permissive public attitude may beget or reflect fraudulent
activities. 21 According to many insurance industry representatives,
fraud has become quite common among insurance claimants22 and
professionals in related activities.23 Studies seem to confirm the
hypothesis: Fraud is rampant.24 Nevertheless, many insurance com-
79-93 (analyzing how respondents' estimates of fraud correspond to their own attitudes on the
subject).
19. See supra note 16.
20. Jon E. Crosby, Insurance Fraud-More Than an Economic Crime, FLA.
UNDERWRITER, June 1990, at 32, 36; see also Fraudulent Auto Accidents Viewed as a Thriving
Racket, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1985, at B25 (a participant in staged car accident insurance
fraud schemes quit "when he realized that innocent people were being [physically] injured").
21. It also undergirds public attempts to reduce overall insurance rates, such as
California's Proposition 103 (codified at CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 -. 16 (West Supp. 1991)).
See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989); see also Guaranty Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990) (comparing a Nevada insurance rate rollback
statute with the California scheme). For a thoughtful analysis of expansive liability concepts
and their relationship to insurance problems such as lessened availability, affordability, and
scope of coverage, see George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
22. Robert G. Knowles, Florida Nets $500 Million Fraud Ring, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED., Jan. 15, 1990, at 1; Mazzuca, supra note 5;
Paul E. Tracy & James A. Fox, A Field Experiment on Insurance Fraud in Auto Body Repair,
27 CRIM. 589 (Aug. 1989).
A large portion of the public also seems to believe false claims are very common. ALL-
INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 19 (1989) (in a
public survey, 42% of the respondents stated that false claims in auto insurance are very
common; this percentage was higher than. for any other type of insurance).
23. E.g., auto mechanics, medical specialists, attorneys, adjusters, or other professionals
assisting with claims. See United States v. Jacob, 502 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Md. 1980) (lawyer,
doctor, and insurance adjuster ran a fraud scheme); State v. Dawson, 290 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1974) (attorney faced criminal charges for representing clients in auto fraud cases
against insurance companies); Ann G. Clarke, The War Insurers Must Win, 87 BEST'S
REVIEW, PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED. 51 (June 1986).
24. In Florida, fraud accounts for approximately 13.6% of all automobile insurance
claims payments. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 25 & 69. In Massachusetts,
estimates have come in the same range - 13% to 20% of the annual $1.5 billion in car
insurance claims. Marie Gendron, Insurance Fraud Bureau Lauded by Pols, Activists, BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 27, 1989, at 29. The national figure has been estimated to be 10% to 15% of
all auto insurance claims dollars. Allen, supra note 16 (citing Insurance Information Institute
figures). The United States Chamber of Commerce has estimated that 10% of all insurance
1992]
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panies hesitate to investigate, refer for prosecution, or take other
countermeasures against fraud. 25  This reluctance may be due to a
social aversion against prosecuting white collar crimes.26 Further-
more, insurers have been able to pass along the cost of claims fraud to
consumers in the form of higher premiums.27
claims contain some fraud. Robert E. Hoyt, The Effect of Insurance Fraud on the Economic
System, 8 J. INS. REG. 304, 305 (1990). Of the different types of insurance, fraud seems to
affect automobile insurance the most. Id. at 310 & n.2 (noting that the three most frequently
reported types of fraud in New Jersey each involve automobile insurance, and that a startling
27% of all claims investigated by a national anti-fraud organization, the Insurance Crime
Prevention Institute, involve just one particular scheme-staged automobile accidents).
Experts have estimated fraud involving various types of automobile insurance coverage.
An independent report prepared for the Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts,
HERBERT I. WEISBERG & RICHARD A. DERRIG, BODILY INJURY LIABILITY CLAIMS IN
MASSACHUSETTS: AN INITIAL REPORT ON THE AIB BASELINE STUDY 6-7 (January 19,
1990), examined 426 bodily injury claims in Massachusetts arising from accidents occurring
between July 1, 1985 and June 30, 1986. (The authors began with 597 files, and then excluded
123 PIP subrogation payment claims, as well as 48 claims from the city of Lawrence,
Massachusetts, due to widespread suspicion that the city was "host to an extensive fraud
operation."). The study found that 47 claims (11% of the total sample) contained one or more
of five fraud elements: duplicate claims for a single injury, bills submitted for treatment not
rendered, non-existent or pre-existing condition unrelated to the accident, deliberate
misrepresentation of lost wages, or other material misrepresentations. Id. at 18. Altogether,
31.7% of the claims were cited for fraud (apparent fraud exclusively (2.6%), apparent "build-
up" exclusively (20.7%), or both (8.5%)). Id. at 19. "Build-up" was defined as "an attempt
on the part of the claimant and/or health care provider to inflate the damages for which
compensation is being demanded." Id.; see also infra note 29 (concerning a 1990 closed claims
study determining that 13.6% of claims payments by Florida private passenger auto insurers
were on fraudulent claims).
Some recent auto insurance studies have focused on repairs and theft. Tracy & Fox, supra
note 22, at 601, concluded that the average repair estimate, when covered by insurance, was
32.5% higher than for noncovered repairs. A Massachusetts task force estimated that fraud
was involved in 25% of all reported car thefts. Susan E. Ghezzi, A Private Network of Social
Control: Insurance Investigation Units, 30 Soc. PROB. 521 (1983) (citing GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE ON AUTOMOBILE THEFT, AUTO THEFT IN MASSACHUSETTS - AN EXECUTIVE
RESPONSE (Boston: Gov't Printing Office 1980)). A more current, nationwide estimate is that
15% of all auto theft claims are fraudulent. Philip J. Crepeau, Photo Inspection Helps Deter
Auto Fraud, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED., Sept. 18,
1989, at 18; Peter Van Aartrijk, Insurance Fraud Outlined, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. &
CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED., Feb. 29, 1988, at 4 (noting that in 1986 nearly 70,000
motor vehicles were stolen in Florida alone); see also Barbara Campbell, Fraud Sting Brings
Charges Against 170, UPI REGIONAL NEWS - MICHIGAN, July 21, 1986 (reporting insurance
industry estimates that about 30% of reported auto thefts nationwide are fraudulent).
25. See, e.g., Guy E. Burnette, Defending Against Insurance Fraud, THE BRIEF - A.B.A.
SEC. TORT & INS. PRAC. 43 (Summer 1989); K.M. Chrysler, How Auto-Insurance Thieves Pick
Your Pocket, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 23, 1981, at 42; Clarke, supra note 23, at
60; Telephone Interview with Jed George, Manager of Special Investigations Unit, Region III,
Government Employees Ins. Co. (GEICO) (May 18, 1992); Telephone Interview with Aaron
Mazen, Director, Insurance Fraud Bureau, New York Department of Insurance, and
Treasurer/Past President of the International Association of Insurance Fraud Agencies (May
18, 1992).
26. Tracy & Fox, supra note 22, at 589-90.
27. Clarke, supra note 23, at 51, 56; Fraudulent Auto Accidents Viewed as a Thriving
.INSURANCE CLAIMS FRAUD
If various estimates of the cost of fraud 28 are accurate, fraudulent
claims substantially increase the insurer's cost of doing business.29
Knowledgeable claimants - that is, people who have filed more than
one insurance claim - tend to have less scruples than do novices
Racket, supra note 20. Premium increases do not lead to a correspondingly large drop in
demand for policies or in types or amounts of coverage. The demand for automobile insurance
seems to maintain price inelasticity, especially because most states require some form of
automobile insurance. Hoyt, supra note 24, at 308.
28. Chrysler, supra note 25 (1981 estimate that auto insurance fraud annually costs
insurers, and ultimately policyholders, $3 billion-as much as one-third of car insurance
premiums); Clarke, supra note 23 (1986 insurance industry estimates that $3-5 billion paid
annually in the United States covers fraudulent or partially fraudulent claims-approximately
15% of all paid claims); Jon E. Crosby, We Need to Change Attitudes, FLORIDA
UNDERWRITER, Mar. 1990, at 16 (estimating that annual, nationwide insurance fraud costs
amount to 15 to 33 cents of every premium dollar and between $50 billion and $100 billion in
toto, counting the cost of adjusting, investigating, litigating and paying fraudulent claims);
Vicki Quade, Insurance Fraud: Bogus Car Claims Stir Action, 69 A.B.A.J. 1205 (1983)
(estimating that stemming fraud could lower insurance premiums by at least 8%, and noting
that insurer sources estimate that 10% of all car claims are fraudulent); Robin Yocum &
Catherine Candisky, Insurance Scams Cost Consumers Billions, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec.
18, 1988, at IA (graph showing that 25% of comprehensive auto insurance is spent on fraud);
Zinkewicz, supra note 5 (remarking that speakers at a meeting of the International Association
of Insurance Fraud Agencies and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
"pointed out that insurance fraud, ranging from mundane cases of padded claims to
sophisticated incidents of organized criminal activities, costs the insurance industry about $16
billion a year"); White Collar Justice, 19 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3 (April 14, 1976) (estimating
the annual cost of insurance fraud to be $1.5 billion to insurers and $0.5 billion to policyholder
victims); see also Catherine Candisky & Robin Yocum, Insurance Companies Wage War on
Fraudulent Claims, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1988, at IA (estimating that total
insurance fraud costs to insurers are at least $66 billion a year); Crepeau, supra note 24, at 20
(citing 1987 FBI data placing car theft costs at over $6 billion annually); Michael Goldsmith &
Todd Maynes, The Undermining of Civil RICO, 2 CRIM. JUSTICE 6, 9 (Spring 1987) (stating,
"[i]nsurance fraud costs $11 billion"); Fraud Costs Consumers $15 Billion Annually, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED. (Feb. 29, 1988), at 37; supra
note 24 (discussing studies attempting to estimate the frequency of various types of auto
insurance fraud); infra note 29 (concerning a 1990 closed claims study determining that
fraudulent claims amounted to 13.6% of all claims payments by Florida private passenger auto
insurers thus leading to estimated annual fraud costs exceeding $364 million in Florida alone).
29. The Florida Insurance Research Center at the University of Florida conducted a study
of 1,709 randomly selected automobile insurance claims files which included a total of 3,016
coverages; all of these claims were closed during the period from March 29 to May 30, 1990.
AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 33-34, 39-40. Twenty-five insurers, representing
nearly 65% of the private auto insurance policies written in Florida, participated. Id. at 30-31.
Analysis determined that an estimated 13.6% of claims payments by Florida private passenger
auto insurers were on fraudulent claims. Id. at 8-9, 68-69. (As one might imagine, the
estimates were much lower for property damage claims than for matters involving personal
injuries. Id. at 40 & 46.)
Applying the above percentages to the total number of auto insurance claims in Florida in
1989 yields an estimate that fraudulently-obtained claims payments for that one year totaled
$364 million. Id. at 69. Of course, the economic impact of auto insurance fraud in Florida is
much greater than $364 million because this amount does not include the costs of application
fraud, loss adjustment expenses, insurer fraud investigation units, and state government
expenses related to fraud. Id. at 70.
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about filing for inflated amounts to "cover their deductible" or to
make an easy profit. They may rationalize their misconduct with the
conclusion that "insurance companies make so much money, any-
way."" 0 Insurance fraud sets a vicious cycle in motion: insurance
companies continue to increase premiums for the entire pool of
insureds in order to cover the higher losses, while some consumers file
for additional uncovered amounts to make up for the higher premi-
ums charged.3a
Compounding the problem is the involvement, in some claims, of
unscrupulous professionals. The seemingly easy money from insur-
ance fraud occasionally may tempt medical, legal, or other experts
assisting with insurance claims.3 2 Unprincipled doctors, chiroprac-
tors, attorneys, and insurance adjusters may help claimants and poli-
cyholders to build and file falsified claims.
When involved in fraudulent activities, doctors and adjusters
pose acute problems because of their specialized knowledge and
because documents provided by them are freely used to evaluate
claims. Physicians, lawyers, and insurance adjusters have been
caught in both large and small-scale fraudulent operations.3 3 Their
30. See supra note 16; see also INS. INFO. INST., INSURANCE PULSE (4th Quarter 1989)
(copy on file with the author) (73% of the public states that the belief insurance companies are
very wealthy is a somewhat important or very important reason people may cheat on insurance
claims). The chief of Ohio's insurance fraud division, Marsha Hartley, stated that many
people view the insurer "as a big company picking on the little guy" when it investigates
claims. Yocum & Candisky, supra note 28, at 2A. This "tough image" simply may add to the
perception that insurers are "big companies with deep pockets." Candisky & Yocum, supra
note 28. Hartley says, "[p]eople pay those premiums for years and years. They look at this as
a way to recover some of that money." Yocum & Candisky, supra note 28, at 2A.
Perhaps the better results for knowledgeable claimants are not an indication of "better"
(harder to detect) fraud schemes, but of greater insurance company negotiating leverage over
inexperienced claimants. The insurance industry may educate its consumers quite poorly
about coverage, rate-setting, and claims practices because of "a feeling ... that ignorant clients
are easier to 'deal' with." Hoyt, supra note 24, at 306.
31. Clarke, supra note 23, at 56; Crepeau, supra note 24, at 18; Fraudulent Auto Accidents
Viewed as Thriving Racket, supra note 20. For a state-by-state table indicating average
automobile insurance premiums for each of the years 1984 through 1988, see A.M. BEST CO.,
Best's Insurance Management Reports, Feb. 9, 1990 (indicating that the national average for
automobile insurance premiums has increased much faster than the overall inflation rate).
32. Of course, this assertion is not intended to impugn the many medical and legal
professionals who are involved in legitimate insurance claims. An attorney may perform vital
services as a claimant's counsellor and advocate, and doctors often play a crucial role in the
claims process via diagnosis and treatment of auto accident injuries.
33. See United States v. Jacob, 502 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Md. 1980); Pearce v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 476 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); State v. Dawson, 290 So.2d
79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Catherine Candisky & Robin Yocum, Scams Take Ingenuity But
Usually Follow Patterns, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 1988, at 3B (describing
"doctor/lawyer conspiracies"; according to the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute, many
accident victims do not know of collusion between the doctor and the lawyer); Don J.
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schemes include assisting claimants in padding valid claims and creat-
ing entirely fictitious claims.34 These bogus claims may exist solely on
paper or may involve other members of the fraud ring who act as the
claimants. While investigators must be careful in gathering the
evidence, 3  developing the charges,36 and prosecuting the defend-
DeBenedictis, The Alliance: Did a Network of Small Southern California Law Firms Conspire
to Defraud Insurance Companies to the Tune of $200 Million?, 75 A.B.A.J. 59 (Dec. 1989)
[hereinafter DeBenedictis, The Alliance]; Don J. DeBenedictis, $2 Million Civil RICO Suit
Brought Against Accident Fraud Operation, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 16 [hereinafter
DeBenedictis, Accident Fraud Operation]; Knowles, supra note 22; Mazzuca, supra note 5;
Mark Thompson, RICO Suit Against Lawyers, Doctors Allowed, L.A. DAILY J., April 22, 1986,
at BI; Chicago Attorney Sentenced to Five Years in Prison, 17 ICPI REPORT 2 (4th Issue 1990);
Doctor and Legal Assistant Charged in California with $1IG Fraud Attempt, 17 ICPI REPORT
14 (3d Issue 1990); Final Sentencings in White-Collar Fraud Ring, 17 ICPI REPORT 4 (4th
Issue 1990); Florida Fraud Mill Shut Down, Chiropractor and Attorney Wife Arrested, 17 ICPI
REPORT 2 (3d Issue 1990); From Coast to Coast, Staged Accident Rings Continue to Proliferate,
18 ICPI REPORT 1 (1st Issue 1991); Indictment Names New Jersey Law Firm and Osteopathic
Office in Racketeering Scheme, 18 ICPI REPORT 4 (1st Issue 1991); Insurance Adjuster and
Wife Sentenced for Auto Accident-Related Medical Fraud, 17 ICPI REPORT 9 (4th Issue 1990);
Insurance Adjuster Indicted for $91G Insider Theft Scheme, 17 ICPI REPORT 4 (4th Issue
1990); Nine Indicted in Memphis for $108G Staged Auto Accident Schemes: Second Wave in
Long-term Investigation, 17 ICPI REPORT 3 (2d Issue 1990); Personal Injury Attorneys and
Five Others Indicted in $9 Million Racketeering Scheme, 17 ICPI REPORT I (2d Issue 1990);
Staged Auto Accident Defrauder Sentenced to One Year: $84,605 Restitution Ordered, 18 ICPI
REPORT 3 (1st Issue 1991).
34. INSURANCE CRIME PREVENTION INSTITUTE, 1989-1990 ANNUAL DIRECTOR'S
REPORT 29-30, 32-34 (1990); Chicago Attorney Sentenced to Five Years in Prison, supra note
33; Doctor and Legal Assistant Charged in California with $1IG Fraud Attempt, supra note 33;
Final Sentencings in White-Collar Fraud Ring, supra note 33; Florida Fraud Mill Shut Down,
Chiropractor and Attorney Wife Arrested, supra note 33.
35. See United States v. Jacob, 502 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Md. 1980) (defendant attorney,
charged with filing a false income tax return, was allegedly part of an automobile insurance
fraud ring with a doctor and claims adjusters that was designed to obtain wrongly inflated
personal injury settlements; the court ordered suppression of evidence seized during search of
lawyer's office because search warrant was too indefinite about the crimes for which evidence
was sought); State v. Dawson, 290 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (all charges dismissed
against attorney charged with grand larceny for making fraudulent representations in the car
accident claims of his clients, because documents had been produced in violation of lawyer's
privilege against self-incrimination under the U.S. Constitution and FLA. STAT. ch. 914.04
(1971)).
36. Cox v. State, 443 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Cox allegedly telephoned two
agents for his insurer and reported the theft of a trailer that he knew had not been stolen. He
subsequently withdrew the claim, and the insurer made no payments to Cox or anyone else.
Cox was charged with making a false report of a crime and with violating the false insurance
claims statute. At the urging of Cox's lawyer, the trial judge instructed the jury on the crime
of attempt as well as the false insurance claims criminal statute and the jury convicted Cox of
"attempted false and fraudulent insurance claim." Id. at 1014.
The District Court of Appeal reversed the false insurance claims conviction. It noted that
the applicable statute already encompasses attempts. Thus there could be no separate crime of
attempting to violate the false insurance claims statute. Id. at 1015. The attempt conviction
was overturned and the case remanded for a new trial on the false insurance claim charge.
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ants, 37 recent cases throughout the nation show that auto insurance
fraud rings can be detected and destroyed, and that the members can
be convicted and sent to prison.38 Clearly, the numbers are signifi-
cant; although only a presumably small percentage of professionals
abuse the insurance system, it does not necessarily follow that -
when insurance fraud does occur - the involvement of professionals
is rare.39
B. Categorizing the Scam: Three Main Types of Fraud Against
Insurers
Fraud occurs in all areas of automobile insurance, particularly
through falsified insurance applications, legitimate but fraudulently
inflated claims, and phony claims.' Experts assume that claims fraud
37. See, e.g., Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (physician tried for
grand larceny for alleged participation, in an insurance fraud scheme involving staged car
accident and feigned injuries; conviction reversed and case remanded for new trial because
prosecutor made improper arguments, including unprofessional language and several remarks
that strongly implied defendant had committed a whole series of crimes for which he was not
on trial).
38. See, e.g., Paul Duggan, Long String of Swindles Alleged at Maryland Sentencing,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1988, at Cl (stating that a group of swindlers repeatedly faked accidents
and collected claims payments of about $200,000 in five months; ringleader sentenced to seven
years in prison); Knowles, supra note 22 (reporting that 32 criminal charges were brought
against nine individuals and three corporations; that both doctors and lawyers were arrested;
that a 16-month investigation netted evidence of a $500 million insurance fraud ring in South
Florida); Personal Injury Attorneys and Five Others Indicted in $9 Million Racketeering
Scheme, supra note 33; Staged Auto Accident Ring Sentenced in Baltimore: $147,854
Restitution Ordered, 17 ICPI Report 12 (2d Issue 1990) (three of four members of the ring
sentenced to prison; full restitution and lengthy probation also ordered); see also UNITED
SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION (USAA), SPECIAL REPORT ON COST CONTAINMENT 7
(1990) (noting that the National Automobile Theft Bureau and the Insurance Crime
Prevention Institute, working in concert with state and local authorities, have been able to
track down and break up numerous fraud rings throughout the country).
39. INSURANCE CRIME PREVENTION INSTITUTE, supra note 34, at 18 (stating that 173 of
613 persons charged with crimes stemming from ICPI investigations in the year ending June
30, 1990, were licensed professionals; these professionals were implicated in 58 different ICPI
investigations involving over $66 million). The ICPI notes that the percentage of cases it
prosecuted in federal courts has risen dramatically from 24.3% in 1987 to 57.3% in 1990. Id.
This increase bespeaks the increasing complexity, costs, organized nature, and interstate
character of much insurance fraud. Id.
40. All areas of the insurance industry are affected by fraud. See, e.g., Ollie L. Blan Jr. &
J. Mark Hart, Fraud in Insurance Contract Litigation - A Defense Viewpoint, 16 CUMB. L.
REV. 447 (1986); Michael Bradford, Fraud Not Chronic, But Still Costly, 21 Bus. INS. 3, Sept.
26, 1987; Alan P. Crawford, In the Industry's Corner, 49 INS. REV. 44 (Sept. 1988);
DeBenedictis, The Alliance, supra note 33; Zinkewicz, supra note 5.
For a discussion of fraud outside the auto insurance field, see Andrew B. Doppelt, Who
You Gonna Call? Fraudbustersl, 33 SECURITY MGMT. 163 (Sept. 1989) (outlining the use of
outside financial fraud investigators); Paul Marcus, White Collar Crime: A Legal Overview, 52
U. CIN. L. REV. 378 (1983) (discussing prosecution of fraud); John Panneton, Federalizing
Fires: The Evolving Federal Response to Arson Related Crimes, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 151
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costs the industry much more than does application fraud." There-
fore, this article focuses primarily on claims. Moreover, while some
insurers and insurance agents have engaged in fraud or other miscon-
duct,42 this article concerns only fraud by claimants or by those acting
on claimants' behalf.43
(1985); Ellen S. Podgor, Tax Fraud -Mail Fraud: Synonymous, Cumulative or Diverse?, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 903 (1989); Fraud Commission's Finding Supported in AICPA Testimony, 164 J.
ACCOUNTANCY 84 (Sept. 1987); John W. Poulous, The Metamorphosis of the Law ofArson, 51
Mo. L. REV. 295 (1986); Note, Prime-Rate Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO. L.J. 1885 (1984);
Project; White-Collar Crime: Survey of Law - 1982 Update, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 291 (1982);
R. Glenn Bauer, A Short History of Maritime Fraud, 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 11 (Fall 1987);
Christie Harlan, Ex-Owner of Sunbelt Savings of Texas Is Indicted on Thrift Fraud Charges,
WALL ST. J., July 12, 1990, at A2; Scot J. Paltrow, Jury Finds Mulheren Guilty of Conspiracy,
Market Manipulation, L.A. TIMEs, July 11, 1990, at DI (securities fraud); Andy Paztor &
Rick Wartzman, Off the Hook.- Hughes Aircraft Chief Is Implicated Belatedly in Defense-
Secret Case, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1990, at Al (defense procurement fraud); John R. Wilke,
Open Sesame: In the Arcane Culture of Computer Hackers, Few Doors Stay Closed, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 22, 1990, at Al (computer fraud). For white collar crime in general, estimates have
placed the annual cost between $40 billion and $200 billion. See Georgette Bennett, The
Future of White-Collar Crime, NAT. L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 15. This article, however,
concentrates solely on automobile insurance fraud.
41. Clarke, supra note 23, at 51; Fraudulent Auto Accidents Viewed as a Thriving Racket,
supra note 20.
42. See supra note 5. Such actions include: (1) alteration of documents (see, e.g., Martinez
v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., No. CL 87-4877 AI (Cir. Ct. of 15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach
County, Fla., Second Amended Complaint, filed July 7, 1989) (alleging that the insurer caused
or procured the alteration of an independent medical examination report and used that altered
report to deny further personal injury protection benefits, in violation of Florida statutes as
well as of the law of fraud); (2) for supposedly impartial physical examinations, knowing use of
doctors who routinely diagnose the claimant as malingering or otherwise "side" with the
insurer (Letters to Robert W. Emerson from plaintiffs' attorneys John T. Kennedy (May 18,
1990) & Michael A. Viscomi (May 22, 1990)); (3) acceptance of premiums despite having
reason to investigate whether the policyholder gave accurate information, but, when a claim is
made, investigating and perhaps denying all or part of the claim because of such inaccuracies
in the policy application (see infra note 76); (4) stealing or misspending premium dollars (see,
e.g., Zinkewicz, supra note 5). See also Letters to Robert W. Emerson from plaintiffs' attorneys
Richard B. Davis, Jr. (June 14, 1990) (alleging that claims adjusters are paranoid, that too
many policies are wrongfully cancelled, that the insurance industry is "misdealing" with
members of the public and trying to "starve out" the insureds, that insurers "nit pick every
claim" and "rather frequently take advantage of the claims of the elderly, the poor, and the
infirm," that insurers often waste much time and money defending a case until just before
trial-when they offer a long overdue settlement); Karen A. Gievers (June 4, 1990) (stating
that insurers "do a woefully inadequate job" in teaching their agents and customers about the
civil justice system, constitutional rights, general and special damages, the civil responsibility
of parties at fault to compensate victims of negligence, and duties owed to first and third
parties); John T. Kennedy (May 18, 1990) (contending that insurers routinely engage in unfair
claims practices, particularly denial of personal injury protection benefits); Michael A.
Viscomi (May 22, 1990) (contending that certain insurance companies, most of them located
in Miami, "do everything they can to deny and in some cases simply ignore" legitimate claims,
especially denying no-fault benefits).
43. For a list of state laws against insurers' unfair claims settlement practices, see 2 JOHN
C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BAD FAITH 753-56 (5th ed. 1990).
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1. FRAUD IN INSURANCE APPLICATIONS4 4
Some insurance customers try to lower their premiums by falsify-
ing their insurance applications. 45 They fail to list all drivers, 46 omit
previous accidents and tickets, 47 or otherwise avoid full and truthful
disclosure of information requested by the insurer.48 In some states,
the insurer must keep the policy in force after discovery of the misrep-
resentation unless the misrepresentation materially increased the risk
of loss covered by the policy. 49 The insurer may, however, adjust the
premium to reflect the actual risk involved.5°
Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Co. 51 is a representative case in which the
Pennsylvania Superior Court strictly interpreted a statute on policy
cancellation. The insurer issued a binder, then attempted to rescind
the policy after an accident occurred one day later and it discovered
that the insured had provided incorrect answers on the application.52
Despite the insured's misstatements, the insurer had to cover the
accident.53
44. Third-party problems caused by insurance application fraud are outside the scope of
this article. For a discussion of this issue, see Barbara J. Call, Third.Party Problems With
Falsified Insurance Applications, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 671 (1989).
45. See, e.g., Jackson v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA
1980); see also Robert J. Brennan & Jane M. Hanson, Misrepresentation in the Application as
the Basis for Rescission of a Property Insurance Policy, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 451 (1985).
46. See, e.g., Darby v. Safeco Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 37 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
47. See, e.g., Haugseth v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 386 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989);
Benton v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 550 So. 2d 832 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
48. In Pennsylvania, for instance, these actions could be a misdemeanor under 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 474(a) (1971); see also infra note 70 (listing additional state criminal laws).
Such actions also might furnish the insurer with grounds for cancelling the policy. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ch. 627.728 (1991).
49. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-103 (1989) (alternatively, to rescind, the insurer
must show an actual intent of the client to deceive); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.11(2) (West 1980)
(stating that unless the insurer relied on a material misrepresentation or unless the fact
misrepresented contributed to the insured's loss, the insurer cannot avoid its obligations under
an insurance policy).
50. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 447-49 (West 1972 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ch.
627.409(1) (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 186 (1987); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3105-06
(McKinney 1985).
51. 549 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), allocatur granted, 559 A.2d 38 (Pa. 1989).
52. 549 A.2d at 222.
53. Id. at 223 & n. 1. The insurer could, however, cancel the remainder of the policy. Id.
at 223; see also Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 445 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that auto insurer cannot rescind and limit its liability to an innocent third
party injured in an accident with the insured's car, even though the insurer might otherwise
have the right to rescind as a result of the insured's misrepresentations about the owner and
principal driver of the car); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boggs, 271 N.E.2d 855 (Ohio 1971) (finding
that insurer can cancel policy only prospectively if application misrepresentations are material;
once a covered incident occurs, the insurer cannot use the insured's misrepresentations to
avoid liability).
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In some states, the insurer may void the policy once it learns of
the misrepresentation. 4 In others, the insurer may void only the
additional exposure not originally considered as a result of misrepre-
sentation." Of course, if the insurer would not have issued the policy
but for the insured's false statements in the application, grounds exist
for declaring the policy void ab initio.56
When state legislation permits insurers to cancel policies because
of material misrepresentations 7 or fraudulent misstatements in the
application, courts sometimes do not tolerate insurer-fashioned alter-
natives to cancellation. In the Florida case of Jackson v. American
54. 12A JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 7276, 7291-7305 (1981); WILLIAM F. YOUNG & ERIC M. HOLMES, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 150-154 (2d ed. 1985); see, e.g., Benton v. Shelter
Mutual Ins. Co., 550 So. 2d 832 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming trial court's decision that
insured's knowing misrepresentations of her driving record were material to insurer's decision
to issue a policy and that these misrepresentations, discovered after an accident for which the
insured made a claim, rendered her coverage void); United Security Ins. Co. v. Commissioner
of Ins., 348 N.W.2d 34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (denying claim by insured who made
misrepresentation, with no-fault binder rescinded ab initio); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Conley, 194 S.E.2d 170 (W. Va. 1972) (finding policy void ab initio due to insured's
misrepresentations on application).
55. 12A APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 54, § 7294 (concluding that insured's
misrepresentation does not void policy if there is no connection between loss and matters
misrepresented); see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 1988); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-21-105(2) (1991). This rule is most likely to be found in claims involving life insurance
or disability insurance. Several states expressly require that insurers must show a causal
connection between the facts misrepresented in an application and the subsequent loss in order
to deny recovery. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-418 (1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.580
(Vernon 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-10 (1989) (specifically providing that whether a
misstatement contributed to the loss "shall be a question for the jury"). But see Southern
Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Cowger, 748 S.W.2d 332 (Ark. 1988) (overturning prior holding
that required a showing of causation between misrepresentation and loss). The Cowger court
noted a policy dilemma-better treatment of dishonest applicants than honest ones-when
proof of causation is necessary.
[R]egardless of a misrepresentation which causes the insurer to undertake a risk,
[the insurer's] liability will occur unless the loss is related to the fact
misrepresented. This places the policy applicant in the position of being able to
gamble that he or she will not sustain a loss caused by the existence of the fact
misrepresented. The misrepresentation may or may not have an effect. The
party defrauding the insurance company may or may not be rewarded. On the
other hand, the honest applicant who has the same facts to reveal will be denied
coverage because of telling the truth.
Id. at 335.
56. McAllister v. AVEMCO Ins. Co., 528 A.2d 758 (Vt. 1987) (interpreting VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, § 4205 (1984)); see also ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.110 (1991) (similar provision).
57. Cancellations may occur regardless of whether the misrepresentation was intentional;
the key factor is materiality. 12A APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 54, §§ 7293, 7294; see,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-7(b) (1990); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West 1981) (by
statute, materiality is "a question of fact to be determined by the court or jury trying the
case").
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Motorists Ins. Co.," the insured misrepresented on her application
that she drove two miles to work, rather than the actual ten-mile dis-
tance.59 The increased distance led to a higher risk of accident and
entitled the insurer to a higher premium.' Because the insured did
not respond to a premium increase notice from the insurer,6' the
insurer reduced the term of coverage from one year to 289 days.62 A
claim arose after 289 days but before the expiration of the one-year
term.63 The court held that the insurer could not deny coverage and
that it should have cancelled the policy once it learned of the fraudu-
lent misstatement on the application." In light of the "statutorily
mandated fashion" for treating this problem,65 the court found that
no alternative existed.66
Some statutes delineate how an insured's misrepresentations
affect the validity of a policy. 67 In Motors Ins. Co. v. Woodcock,68 the
Third District Court of Appeals of Florida considered a Florida stat-
ute governing insureds' warranties and misrepresentations to the
insurer.69 The court held that the statute gave insurers "a viable
defense even in the absence of effective cancellation. ' 70 After discov-
58. 388 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The insured contended that she never received any notice. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 585.
65. FLA. STAT. ch. 627.728 (1991).
66. Id.; see also Alexander Underwriters Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Lovett, 339 S.E.2d 368 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that insurer's purported cancellation of policy failed because unearned
premium was not returned within the statutory 15-day period after cancellation notice was
sent to the insured; the court upheld a summary judgment for the insured, awarding liability
coverage on an accident occurring subsequent to the attempted cancellation).
The Jackson court evidently meant to encourage insurers to promptly investigate and
respond to application inaccuracies. Accord Haugseth v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 386
S.E.2d 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (after discovering that the insured misrepresented her driving
record, the insurer attempted to cancel her policy while retaining the premium earned to date.
The insurer subsequently denied the insured's claim for the loss of her stolen automobile on
the grounds that the misrepresentation voided the policy. The appellate court overturned a
summary judgment for the insurer because the insurer's method of and delay in cancelling the
policy may have estopped the insurer from voiding the policy).
67. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-7 (1986) (defining effects of representations and
misrepresentations); FLA. STAT. chs. 627.409(l) & 627.728(5) (1991) (concerning respectively,
warranties/misrepresentations and the presumptive notice received by insured).
68. 394 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
69. FLA. STAT. ch. 627.409(1) (1991).
70. 394 So. 2d at 488 (citing Sauvageot v. Hanover Ins. Co., 308 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA
1975)). The statute reads as follows:
[In the application or negotiations for the insurance policy, m]isrepresentations,
omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a
recovery under the policy.., unless:
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ering alleged omissions or misrepresentations about the insured's
driving record, the insurer in Motors offered to continue the insured's
policy upon payment of a higher premium.71 The insured refused to
pay this additional premium and, after the theft and destruction of the
car, filed a claim. The court found no reliance by the insured upon
the insurer's offer to continue coverage at a higher premium. Only
reliance by the insured on the insurer's offer could have estopped the
insurer from asserting its statutory right to contest the policy's
validity.72
In sum, insurers generally have a right to cancel fraudulently
procured policies. 3 Once an insured party is involved in an accident,
however, third parties may have valid claims. At that point, a policy
cancellation affects only the insured and not the innocent third party
whose rights to be made whole have already vested.74 The policy of
protecting innocent third persons may thus bar an insurer from void-
ing fraudulently obtained coverage.7 5 Compulsory policies often pro-
vide, for example, a minimum amount of liability coverage to be
retained. The clear lesson for insurers therefore is: Thoroughly check
the application before issuing the policy. In some cases, the insurer's
right to void a policy may not apply retrospectively-at least not for
parties other than the one who actually made the misrepresentations
(a) They are fraudulent;
(b) They are material either to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard
assumed by the insurer; or
(c) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy...,
would not have issued it at the same premium rate... [or] in as large
an amount, or would not have provided coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been made known to
the insurer as required either by the application for the policy ... or
otherwise.
FLA. STAT. ch. 627.409(1) (1991). Some states with criminal laws specifically prohibiting false
statements in insurance applications include: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.360(o) & (q)(7)
(1984) (misdemeanor)); Florida (FLA. STAT. chs. 626.9541(k)(2) & 817.236 (1991)); Georgia
(GA. CODE ANN. § 33-1-9 (1991 & Supp. 1992)); Indiana (IND. CODE 27-8-3-21 (1986)); Mon-
tana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-401(1) (1991) (misdemeanor)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59A-16-23(A)(l) & (B) (1988) (felony)); Pennsylvania (40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 474(a)
(1971) (misdemeanor)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-33-37 (1990) (misdemeanor)); Ver-
mont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4205 (1984)).
71. Motors Ins. Co. v. Woodcock, 394 So. 2d 485, 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
72. Id. at 489 (citing a waiver case, Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 337 So. 2d 418
(Fla. 2d DCA 1976)).
73. Edward M. Miller, Current Issues in Insurance Policy Litigation, 68 MICH. B.J. 46, 48
(1989) (stating that, "[in the absence of a provable waiver by the insurer, or estoppel to assert
it, fraud will vitiate coverage").
74. 12A GEORGE G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:903 (2d ed. 1981);
see also supra note 53.
75. Id. § 45:906.
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in the application. In fact, by the time a claim arises, a court may
even bar an insurer's attempt to deny coverage for the misrepresent-
76ing person.
2. FRAUDULENTLY INFLATED CLAIMS
a. Settlement Practices, Claimant Motivations, and Group Norms
Inflated claims probably are much more frequent than outright
phony claims. 7 Insurers may pay exaggerated claims simply because
the time and money spent to deny a padded claim exceeds that of
simply paying the inflated claim. 78 As one commentator put it:
[W]hen adjusters are faced with piles of claims on their desks and
are pressured to settle them, they tend to separate the clearly
fraudulent claims from the less obvious ones. Lacking adequate
resources to investigate, they pay many claims from the less obvi-
ous that are questionable. Once payment is made, the claim
becomes legitimate and is "lost forever."
79
Insureds pad claims for a variety of reasons. Some pad valid
claims to get compensation for non-covered portions of the loss, to
"recover" past premiums paid, or just to make a profit. 80 Others pad
their claims to meet the damages prerequisite for filing a tort suit; the
76. This situation could arise when the insured who made the misrepresentation points to
insurer misconduct in the form of ex post facto underwriting. The claim is that the insurer
issues policies and accepts premiums when it knows, or should know, that the applicant is
ineligible for coverage; if the insured files a claim, his "fraud" in obtaining the policy-his
misrepresentation-is exposed and the insurer then denies the claim. Miller, supra note 73, at
48. Miller notes that insurers can detect misrepresentations by consulting the Cleveland
(Regional) Index Bureau, a compilation of all injury claims data, and, for property damages,
the Property Loss Register. Id. Access to such information may serve to estop insurers from
claiming reliance on falsehoods found in insurance applications. Id. at 48-49. See State Farm
Ins. Co. v. Kurylowicz, 242 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (requiring the insurer to
investigate applicants promptly-holding that deferring investigation until an insured files a
claim violates public policy); Miller, supra note 73, at 48.
77. WEISBERG & DERRIG, supra note 24, at 18-19; Clarke, supra note 23. Obviously,
claim negotiation tactics may involve some "puffing" of the dollar amount of damages. Claims
personnel and, at a somewhat higher rate, defense and plaintiffs' attorneys usually agree that
exaggerations about value are an acceptable tactic when used by claimants or their attorneys
during settlement negotiations on bodily injury or uninsured motorist liability. AUTO INS.
FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at 7, 18, 22, 29, 33, app. D at 7, 19 (Attorney Survey,
Question 18a & Claims Personnel Survey, Question 15a). Accord id. app. F at 12, 25, 29
(Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 22a). Misstatements of fact, though, are strongly
condemned by all groups. Id. (Attorney Survey, Questions 19a-d; Claims Personnel Survey,
Questions 16a-d). Accord id. app. F at 12-13, 25, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Questions 23a-
d).
78. Clarke, supra note 23.
79. Id.
80. Tracy & Fox, supra note 22, at 590; AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 98.
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typical no-fault state"1 permits claimants to escape no-fault and bring
a tort action only if their damages exceed a certain minimum. 2
Defense attorneys, insurers' general counsel, and claims person-
nel believe that the presence of a claimant's attorney in a case greatly
increases the likelihood that bodily injury, uninsured motorist,13 per-
sonal injury protection, 4 and medical payments claims will be
inflated.8 5  Curiously, while a large majority of each group--claims
personnel, defense attorneys, and plaintiffs' counsel--considers insur-
81. See infra note 84.
82. As noted by no-fault experts Jeffrey O'Connell and Robert H. Joost, the effect of such
a rule may be to encourage inflation of claims. O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice
Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61, 70 & n.28 (1986).
83. Every state has a financial responsibility law meant to require all drivers to obtain at
least a minimum amount of liability insurance. JAMES L. ATHEARN, ET AL., RISK &
INSURANCE 434 (6th ed. 1989). Nonetheless, nationally approximately 10% of all vehicles are
uninsured. A.M. BEST Co., Best's Insurance Management Reports, May 14, 1990.
84. About half of the states have no-fault laws. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-89-202 to 23-89-
208 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-4-701 to -723 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to 38-350 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (1985 & Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2101 to 35-2114
(1988 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. chs. 627.730-.7405 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:10C-
101 to 431:10C-121 (1985 & Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to 40-3121 (1986 &
Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-.010 to 304.39-.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1990); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 48A, §§ 538-547A (1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 90, §§ 34A,
34D, 34M, 34N & 340 (1989 & Supp. 1991) and ch. 175, § 113A-D (1987 & Supp. 1991);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 500.3101-.3179 (1983 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.41 to
65B.71 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264.16 (1982 & Supp. 1991); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to 39:6A-35 (West 1990); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-5108 (McKinney
1985 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-41-01 to 26.1-41-19 (1989 & Supp. 1990); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 742.520-.542 (1989 & Supp. 1990); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1711-1724
(Purdon 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-6 to -8 (1990); TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§§ 5.06-.12 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-22-306 to 31A-22-309
(1991 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2202 (Michie 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 632.32(4)(b) (West 1980). Of these states, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania use verbal thresholds; Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Utah use monetary thresholds; and Arkansas,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin have no real limitation on tort rights. See INSURANCE
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE FACT BOOK: 1992 PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE
FACTS 101-102 (1992).
In Florida, the no-fault statute requires an expert medical opinion of permanent injury to
support damage claims. FLA. STAT. ch. 627.737 (1991). A United States Department of
Transportation study concluded that this "verbal threshold" in the Florida statute significantly
contributed to a slowdown in the increase of automobile insurance premiums. OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF TRANSP., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT
VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 28 (May,
1985); accord Telephone Interview with Jed George, supra note 25.
85. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at 4, 6, 17-18, 22 (Attorney Survey-
answers of defense attorneys-Questions 6, 7, 15, 16); id., app. F at 5, 7, 23-24, 29 (Insurers'
Counsel Survey, Questions 7, 8, 16, 17); id., app. D. at 4, 6, 18-19, 22-23 (Claims Personnel
Survey, Questions 3, 4, 12, 13). On the whole, plaintiffs' attorneys disagree. Id., app. C at 4, 6,
28-29, 33 (Attorney Survey-answers of plaintiffs' attorneys-Questions 6, 7, 15, 16). See
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ers' understating of values an unacceptable negotiating tactic with
respect to collision, property damage, comprehensive, personal injury
protection and medical payments matters,16 the defense and plaintiffs'
bar is somewhat less likely to condemn such understatements.8 7 In
fact, the lawyers tend to support such behavior for uninsured motorist
and bodily injury liability negotiations while most claims personnel do
not.88 In uninsured motorist or bodily injury cases, which entail more
judgmental and subjective quantification of damages, attorneys thus
seem more willing than claims personnel to accept exaggerations or
understatements from either side.8 9 Evidently, attorneys more readily
distinguish between factual misstatements and negotiating ploys based
on opinion rather than alleged facts.
b. Inflating of Property Damage and Personal Injuries
Claimants may fraudulently inflate auto property damage. For
example, a claimant obtains several estimates of the damage to her
car. She then uses the highest estimate to file for reimbursement from
the insurance company, while actually having repairs performed at
infra Appendix, Tables 1 & 2 (uninsured motorist or bodily injury inflation of damages depend
upon whether plaintiffs have an attorney).
Plaintiffs' lawyers believe that the opposite behavior, insurers' deflating of damages,
occurs quite frequently, especially in uninsured motorist or bodily injury liability cases; claims
personnel believe that it is rare. The defense attorneys' collective opinion lies in between,
except for personal injury protection and medical payments matters (in which defense and
plaintiffs' attorneys have similar opinions). AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at
5-6, 17-18, 22, 28-29, 33, app. D at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23 (Attorney Survey, Questions 8, 11, 14 &
17; Claims Personnel Survey, Questions 5, 8, 11 & 14). Typically, the views of insurers'
counsel resemble those of the claims personnel and rank between the average claims person's
response and the average defense attorney's opinion. Id., app. F at 5-7, 23-24, 29 (Insurers'
Counsel Survey, Questions 9, 12, 15 & 18); see infra Appendix, Tables 3 & 4 (plaintiffs'
attorney inflation of personal injury protection or medical payments damages, and insurers'
deflation of those damages) and Tables 5 & 6 (insurer deflation of uninsured motorist or bodily
injury damages and of collision and/or property damages, respectively).
86. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at 8, 19, 22, 30, 33; app. D at 8, 19, 23
(Attorney Survey, Questions 20b-d; Claims Personnel Survey, Questions 17b-d); see infra
Appendix, Tables 7-9.
87. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at 8, 19, 22, 30, 33; app. D at 8, 19, 23
(Attorney Survey, Questions 20b-d; Claims Personnel Survey, Questions 17b-d); see infra
Appendix, Tables 7-9.
88. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at 8, 19, 22, 30, 33; app. D at 8, 19, 23
(Attorney Survey, Question 20a; Claims Personnel Survey, Question 17a); see infra Appendix,
Table 10. Perhaps claims personnel fear allegations of bad faith or of other claims of unfair
practices so much that they believe even a give-and-take negotiating process could later be
used as evidence of the insurer's "wrongful" behavior. See infra Part IV.B (Concerns About
Bad Faith).
89. See supra note 77; AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4; app. C at 7-8, 18-19, 22,
29-30, 33; app. D at 7-8, 19, 23 (Attorney Survey, Questions 18a & 20a; Claims Personnel
Survey, Questions 15a & 17a); infra Appendix, Tables 10 & 11.
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the shop that wrote the lowest estimate.9 Also, unscrupulous body
shops sometimes write the estimate a little higher to "help" the dis-
honest claimant.9 ' Perhaps the claimant justifies this behavior by
arguing that she only collects the extra money to compensate for her
deductible.9 2
Claimants may also pad claims for medical bills by attempting to
collect for treatment of injuries not caused by the accident. They
include bills for routine checkups9 3 with the bills for treatment of a
covered injury. Insurers also contend that sometimes insureds obtain
medical treatment to increase "specials" 94 rather than for medical
reasons.
95
Adjusters can counter inflated claims by carefully reviewing all
bills and estimates. Consultation with medical experts or others hay-
90. There have been legislative proposals to prevent such incidents. For instance, a
Florida bill expressly permitted insurers to encourage their insureds to use an insurer-approved
repair facility and to have insurers pay the facility directly. 1982 Fla. Laws 243 (unenacted ch.
627.7289). Permitting the insured to decide how and whom to pay is more meaningful if the
insured selects options at the start of the policy, rather than after an occurrence. This would
permit insurers to pass along cost savings, in the form of lower premiums, to those insureds
choosing the less costly form of repairs reimbursement.
91. They may also charge substantially more for repairs covered by insurance than for
noncovered repairs. Tracy & Fox, supra note 22.
92. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text about public attitudes toward insurers
and insurance claims fraud. An industry study conducted in the mid-1980s indicated that
"most people think it is okay to pad their claim to cover a deductible." Hanson, supra note 16
(a survey by the All-Industry Research Advisory Council (AIRAC) found that 31% of the
public agreed that it is "all right to increase the amount of your claim to make up for a
deductible"); accord AIRAC, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 12 (1991) (about one-third of
those surveyed in 1981, 1983, and 1989 seemed to agree that it was "all right to increase the
amount of your insurance claim by a small amount [in order] to make up for the deductible
.. "). Of course, the deductible is calculated into the amount charged for the premium; for
lower or no deductibles, a higher premium customarily is charged, unless proscribed by law.
93. Routine checkups create medical expenses that auto insurance is not intended to cover.
94. The term "specials" or "special damages" is commonly used in the insurance industry
to describe medical bills, lost wages, and other specific economic losses. DAVIDS, supra note 6,
at 427 (defining special damages as "[tihose which are the natural, but not the necessary
consequences of the act complained. Actual loss as distinguished from presumed loss"). It is
often a base from which settlements are negotiated--e.g., a payment of "three times specials."
ATHEARN, ET AL., supra note 83; H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE
SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 108-11 (rev. 2d ed. 1980) (discussing
various multipliers applied to special damages - the average seems to be settlements for about
three times these amounts).
95. See WEISBERG & DERRIG, supra note 24, at 18-19 (finding extensive "build-up"-
claimants and health care providers trying to inflate damages for which they seek
compensation). When asked why certain automobile insurance fraud cases are not sent by
insurers to the Florida Insurance Fraud Division, nine claims persons specifically blamed
collusion between plaintiffs' lawyers and health care providers, which presumably makes fraud
difficult to detect, let alone prove. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24
(Claims Personnel Survey, Question 22); infra Appendix, Table 12; see also O'Connell & Joost,
supra note 82, at 70-71.
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ing special knowledge is necessary at times. For instance, insurers
often use staff appraisers as well as independent appraisal firms spe-
cializing in insurance work to evaluate automobile damages. 96 No
appraiser, however, can keep insureds from cheating by failing to
repair the car after payment and then claiming the same damage on
subsequent claims. 97
c. Fighting in Court the Fraudulent Inflation of Claims
Attempts to inflate claims are not consistently prosecuted
because claimants, if challenged, often back down and claim the
appropriate amount. 98 Prosecutors do, however, pursue some gross
cases of claim inflation. Florida brought criminal charges for claim
inflation in State v. Book.99 The insured, Book, purchased a Mercedes
for $44,000. Three weeks later it was stolen. Book estimated the car's
value in his initial telephone claim at $57,000, in an affidavit filed with
the insurer at $50,000, and in an invoice Book had the auto company
send to the insurer at $53,000. Book received an insurance settlement
greater than the amount he paid for the car, but the inconsistencies in
his statements ultimately led to an indictment for the uttering of a
false document, grand theft, and three counts of filing a fraudulent
insurance claim.1°° A Florida appellate court reversed the trial
judge's order dismissing all of the charges and held that the insured
made material misrepresentations about the purchase price "obvi-
ously... believ[ing] that an inflated purchase price would enable him
96. Insurers believe that these efforts are well worth their cost because they reduce or
eliminate the necessity to rely on inflated body shop estimates. The claimant may still find
someone to repair the car for less, but at least the insurer paid only the estimated market value
of the repairs.
97. See Crepeau, supra note 24, at 40 (noting that the defrauder may obtain insurance for a
substandard or previously damaged vehicle, or declare a collision or vandalism which actually
occurred before this particular policy began; both schemes are designed to make the insurer
believe the car was insured in good condition, and thus to assure higher pay-outs on a claim).
Perhaps only re-inspection by the appraiser and an eye for old damage can prevent double
payment for the same damage. But see infra note 119 (concerning automobile inspection
requirements for new insurance policies).
98. But see Cox v. State, 443 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Cox allegedly falsely
reported to his insurer the theft of a trailer and then withdrew the claim. The insurer made no
payments, but Cox was still charged with crimes and convicted. This case is further discussed
at note 36, supra.
When asked why insurers might not refer fraud cases to the state insurance fraud division,
only one claims adjuster wrote that claimants, if confronted, usually back off from fraudulent
claims, thus rendering referral unnecessary. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D
at 24 (Claims Personnel Survey, Question 22) (255 of 400 respondents furnished an answer to
this open-ended question); infra Appendix Table 12.
99. 523 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
100. Id. at 637. The three counts for insurance claims crimes, FLA. STAT. ch. 817.234(l)(b)
(1991), were based on the actions producing the three different figures submitted to the insurer.
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to secure a more desirable settlement."'' The court refused to recog-
nize the insurer's failure to include the statutorily required warning
about the felonious nature of false claims 10 2 as a valid defense to
insurance claims crimes. 0 3
Book notwithstanding, fraud can be exceedingly difficult to prove
in a criminal or civil court. The burden of proof, even in civil cases, is
much greater than a preponderance of evidence."° Moreover, doubts
tend to be resolved in favor of the accused defrauder. Even with
apparently baseless claims, the claimant generally has the right to a
jury trial, especially if the dispute concerns physical injuries. 0 5
In Francois v. Harris,106 the trial court dismissed a personal
injury suit. 107 Francois supposedly felt pain in his knee and back
immediately after the accident, but failed to seek medical care until at
101. 523 So. 2d at 638.
102. The provision is as follows:
All claims forms shall contain a statement in a form approved by the Department
of Insurance that clearly states in substance the following: "Any person who
knowingly and with intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurance company
files a statement of claim containing any false, incomplete, or misleading
information is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
FLA. STAT. ch. 817.234(l)(b) (1991).
103. 523 So. 2d at 639.
104. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 424 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (stating, "a stricter
standard, in some such phrases as 'clear and convincing proof,' is commonly applied to
measure the necessary persuasion for a charge of fraud"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Cameron
Beard, A Lawyer's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Professional Disciplinary Proceedings,
96 YALE L.J. 1060, 1061 & n.3 (1987) (in civil cases, fraud must be established by clear and
convincing evidence, not just by a preponderance of evidence); see, e.g., American State Ins.
Co. v. Ehrlich, 701 P.2d 676, 679 (Kan. 1985) (alleged fraud in obtaining an automobile
insurance policy; misrepresentation about marital status). In ordinary civil matters, the
preponderance of evidence standard applies. 9 WIGMORE, supra at 419.
105. These matters involve difficult damages issues beyond the usual calculation of fair
market value for property damages and the wading through of bills which need to be
reimbursed, etc. For instance, in Burkett v. Parker, 410 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) the
trial court had granted the defendant a summary judgment after the treating physician testified
that there was no permanent injury, the applicable no-fault "threshold" requirement. The
appellate court promptly vacated the judgment because the physician, understandably
unwilling to rule out completely certain future medical developments, also had stated that
permanency "could be possible."
Even insurance company representatives distinguish between "puffing" or other
exaggeration with respect to uninsured motorist or bodily injury claims, as opposed to other
types of claims tied more directly to the reimbursement of specific bills. Supra note 77; AUTO
INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 7, 19 (Claims Personnel Survey, Question 15a).
The insurers themselves also appear to be more inclined to deflate damages in personal injury
matters. Plaintiffs' attorneys contend that such insurer gamesmanship is most common in
uninsured motorist or bodily injury cases. Supra note 85.
106. 366 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
107. This suit only concerned damages; defendants had already conceded liability. Id.
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least three days later, after being advised to do so by an attorney. 10 8
Francois' answers to interrogatories pointed to far more serious and
long-lasting injuries than did his testimony at trial three months
later. 109 He testified at trial to a successful chiropractic treatment and
no physical complaints since December 1976.110 The answers to the
interrogatories on November 30, 1977, stated that he continued to
suffer from recurrent backaches which interfered with his work. The
answers also included a final report from the chiropractor asserting
that Francois had a "5% permanent partial disability.""' His claim
furthermore contained inconsistencies regarding lost earnings.I l2
The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case
for a new trial, concluding that "[iun all but the most extreme cases,
our system entrusts juries with the ultimate decisions as to whether
claimed injuries are genuine or not. Our experience has demonstrated
that juries deserve this trust and that they are well able to discern the
truth and to render judgment accordingly.""'  This aversion to pre-
jury dismissals on matters of fraud is widespread in state courts.
Judges traditionally do not want to bypass juries on such a basic area
of factual interpretation. They are skeptical of summary judgments,
directed verdicts, and reversals of jury verdicts." 4
3. FALSE CLAIMS
Probably the most costly type of fraud is the false claim,1"' usu-
ally filed by the insured alone. Other possible participants in this type
of fraud are "professional claimants" or dishonest medical, legal, or
other specialists who, absent fraud, ordinarily play legitimate roles in
108. 366 So. 2d at 851, 852 n.4. The attorney's "runner" had given Francois a ride home
after the accident. Id.
109. 366 So. 2d 851. Francois evidently contended that he did not prepare or even read the
interrogatories he swore to and signed. Id. at 852 n.4.
110. Id. at 851. The trial was in February, 1978.
111. Id. at 851-52.
112. Id. at 852 n.2.
113. Id. at 852. The court cited Young v. Curgil, 358 So. 2d 58, 59-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
for the proposition that facts which support a conclusion that the plaintiff has feigned his
injuries must reach a level constituting "outrageous misuse of the system of justice" to justify a
dismissal. Cf. Hodjales v. Loeb, 291 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (plaintiff admitted
changing prior sworn testimony so that he could recover against an insured defendant; his case
was dismissed).
114. For an example of a judicial determination that a jury was unreasonable, see Darby v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 533 So. 2d 37 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing a jury's
determination that non-disclosed member of household was covered under auto insurance
policy).
115. See Laura Mazzuca, States Track Insurance Fraud as the Crime is on the Rise, Bus.
INS., Jan. 2, 1988, AGENT/BROKER ToPics, at 34D.
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the insurance claims process." 16
Policyholders who successfully padded previous claims and those
who felt they did not receive proper compensation for a prior claim
may file totally fictitious claims. Occasionally, people take out poli-
cies for the sole purpose of filing false claims at a future date.'" For
example, after sustaining an uninsured loss, some claimants purchase
insurance and then file a claim."I8 This method of fraud is common
with previously wrecked and stolen cars."I9
Claimants also may defraud insurers by filing a claim for damage
or theft that has not occurred or for a car that does not exist. 120 Some
owners file false theft claims for automobiles with severe engine
trouble in order to collect insurance proceeds.12' Also, some insureds
who have difficulty making their car loan payments "solve" the prob-
lem via automobile theft. 122 While eventual discovery of the fraud
116. See John F. Berry, 3 Frisco Executives Indicted for Auto Insurance Fraud, WASH.
POST, May 5, 1978, at Fl; DeBenedictis, The Alliance, supra note 33; DeBenedictis, Accident
Fraud Operation, supra note 33; Fraudulent Auto Accidents Viewed as a Thriving Racket, supra
note 20; Knowles, supra note 22; McLeod, supra note 5; Thompson, supra note 33. Note that
collusion between health care providers and plaintiffs' attorneys was rarely suggested as a
reason why insurers fail to report automobile insurance fraud to the fraud division. AUTO INS.
FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24 (Claims Personnel Survey, Question 22) (only nine
responses out of 255 who wrote answers); see infra Appendix, Table 12.
117. See, e.g., Duggan, supra note 38 (discussing how an itinerant group of swindlers took
out multiple insurance policies in order to fake accidents and otherwise collect on false claims);
Insurance, UPI, Aug. 14, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file (describing how a
man purchased auto insurance in fifteen states in order to make false claims, then filed and
collected claims totalling as much as $400,000 on just one car).
118. Crepeau, supra note 24; Illinois Man Sentenced for $8G Auto Fraud Scheme, 17 ICPI
REPORT 3 (4th Issue 1990); Tracy & Fox, supra note 22.
119. Crepeau, supra note 24, at 40. The best means to deter this type of fraud is to require
that the agent writing the policy initially inspect the automobile. Some insurers, such as
Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), make such inspections a standard
procedure in the application process. Telephone Interview with Jed George, supra note 25.
Most insurers, however, do not follow such a procedure; consequently, a few state legislatures
recently have intervened by enacting laws requiring such inspections. See, e.g., California
Assembly Bill No. 3469 (approved by Governor, September 10, 1990, and filed with secretary
of state, September 13, 1990), 1990 Cal. Stat., c. 736 (codified at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 400-405
(West Supp. 1992); 1990 Florida Act, Senate Bill 2670, codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.744
(1991) (eff. Oct. 1, 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 113S (1989); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 211,
§ 94 (1989). New York enacted the model statute in 1977. Crepeau, supra note 24. N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 67 (Regulation No. 79) (1977) implemented the statute.
120. CLINTON TERRY & CHARLES KREBS, AUTO THEFT AND AUTO RELATED CRIMES IN
SOUTH FLORIDA (DADE, BROWARD, AND PALM BEACH COUNTIES) (report prepared for the
South Florida Alliance to Combat Theft in Our Neighborhood Council - ACTION) 48; see
Crepeau, supra note 24, at 40; see also supra note 119.
121. TERRY & KREBS, supra note 120, at 15, 47. Such owners simply may abandon the
vehicle or hand it over to thieves. See Allen, supra note 16, at B25; Crepeau, supra note 24, at
40.
122. Allen, supra note 16, at B8; TERRY & KREBS, supra note 120, at 15, 47. These
automobiles often are sold for parts or sold intact on the black market. TERRY & KREBS,
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may lead to civil or criminal punishment, 23 detection is difficult. 24
The economic effects of false claims extend beyond the insurers and
their honest policyholders to innocent lienholders, such as banks,
which may find that their interest is not protected by the insured's
policy in cases of conversion by the insured.' 25
Other fraudulent claims come from so-called professional claim-
ants.' 26 Such claimants not only make false product liability or other
general liability claims, 127 but they also ply their trade in the auto
insurance field. Their modus operandi is to claim accidents in which
the insured was suddenly "cut off" so that she rear ended the claim-
ant, 1 28 accidents in which a phantom vehicle supposedly forced the
supra note 120, at 3, 11, 13; see also United States v. Giannetta, 711 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Me.
1989) (detailing a probationer's auto insurance fraud scheme involving stolen and "stripped"
cars). Another tactic is "car dunking" - placing a car at the bottom of a lake or other body of
water and then claiming it to be stolen. Allen, supra note 16, at B1, B8.
123. See In re Forfeiture of One 1971 Mercedes Benz Automobile, 495 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1986), where the court affirmed the trial court's findings that Starla Rose arranged to
have her car stolen in order to make a fraudulent insurance claim. At the very least, the court
found Rose falsely claimed the car was stolen after the police recovered it. Id. at 227
(Anstead, J., dissenting in part). Rose's Mercedes Benz was forfeited to the state under
Florida Statutes, chs. 932.701-.704 (1986) because it had been "employed as an instrumentality
in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of a felony." Id. See also
James R. Campbell, Fraud Sting Brings Charges Against 170, July 21, 1986, UPI available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire file (detailing how the nation's largest undercover insurance fraud
operation as of 1986 led to criminal charges against 170 persons for fraudulent claims of auto
theft exceeding $100 million); Insurance Fraud Arrests, UPI, Oct. 11, 1983, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting the arrest of five persons "for reporting their vehicles
stolen and filing insurance claims when they actually had abandoned the cars").
124. Crepeau, supra note 24.
125. See Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Florida Bank at Daytona Beach, 452 So. 2d 42 (Fla.
5th DCA 1984) (finding that lienholder was not covered when the insured converted the car
because insurance policy plainly excluded coverage for an insured's acts of conversion, and
because policy provided no special coverage for lienholders). But see Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Michigan Mutual Ins. Co., 445 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (concerning third party
personal injury claims, finding that insurer was estopped from asserting policy rescission
because of insured's application misrepresentations; insurer had to pay up to coverage limits
obtained under insured's policy); supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
126. Professional claimants, either by themselves or in a "band" ("ring"), make their living
by filing and collecting on fraudulent insurance claims. See United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d
1141 (2d Cir. 1984); Chrysler, supra note 25; Duggan, supra note 38; F.B.I. Charges 170 in Car
Insurance Fraud, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1986, at A16; Fraudulent Auto Accidents Viewed as a
Thriving Racket, supra note 20; Insurance Fraud Arrests, supra note 123; Seven Arrested For
Fraud, UPI, May 9, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
127. Professional claimants may pretend, for example, that they consumed a soft drink
which turned out to have a mouse in it. See, e.g., Candisky & Yocum, supra note 33
(describing a number of insurance scams, including the one above); see also Fraud Suspect
Denies Charges, Gainesville Sun, March 30, 1991, at B4 (reporting scheme to defraud insurers
in a series of phony slip-and-fall cases); New Hampshire Man Finds Insurance Industry Not
Tooth Fairy, 17 ICPI Report 10 (4th Issue 1990).
128. See, e.g., Two Cleveland Men Indicted for $22G Caused Accident Fraud Scheme, 17
ICPI Report 12 (2d Issue 1990).
INSURANCE CLAIMS FRAUD
claimant's vehicle off a road and thus injured the driver as well as
numerous passengers,1 29 events causing severe injuries but only slight
damage to the car, and incidents involving pedestrian injuries that did
not incapacitate the claimant.130 Another scam is the staged automo-
bile collision, which involves a conspiracy to file false insurance
claims by a number of persons who planned and executed the
",accident." 131
Challenging the professional claimant is difficult. Usually, the
parties can point to real physical injuries or to damage to the vehicle,
but the damages were sustained under fabricated or non-covered cir-
cumstances and typically are grossly exaggerated. Services such as
the Regional Index Bureau 32 help insurance companies track injury
claims. The bureau provides reporting companies with information
on a claimant's prior claims and injuries. The bureau even describes
similar claims filed under another name, on the assumption that the
same claimant may adopt an alias. By comparing its information
with the information held by such clearinghouses, the insurance com-
pany can avoid paying for an injury another insurer already covered
and also can learn of previously existing conditions. Knowledge of
such conditions helps adjusters to determine what injuries, if any, gen-
uinely arose from a covered accident. 33
129. Staged Auto Accident Ring Sentenced in Baltimore: $147,854 Restitution Ordered,
supra note 38.
130. See supra citations in note 126; see also Candisky & Yocum, supra note 33 (describing
various automobile accident schemes); Van Aartrijk, supra note 24 (outlining various auto
insurance fraud scams).
131. See, e.g., Fernandez v. State, 370 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (upholding
defrauder's conviction for participation in staged accident conspiracy); Allen, supra note 16, at
B8 (stating that rate of reported, staged auto accidents in California has risen 38% annually
from 1986 through 1989); Herb Jaffe, Staged Car Accidents Top List of Schemes, NEWARK
STAR LEDGER, March 18, 1986, at 1; Caused Crashes Send Two to Prison, 17 ICPI Report 12
(4th Issue 1990); Eighteen Members of Organized Fraud Ring Indicted in Texas, 18 ICPI
Report 9 (1st Issue 1991); Four Oklahomans Charged in Alleged $38G Fake Accident Scheme,
17 ICPI Report 10 (4th Issue 1990); From Coast to Coast, Staged Accident Rings Continue to
Proliferate, supra note 33; Insurance Agent and Second Man Sentenced for Staged Auto
Accident Scheme: $175,000 Restitution Ordered, 17 ICPI Report 15 (3d Issue 1990);
Nationwide Staged Auto Accident Ring Collides with Law in Denver: Multi-State Investigation
Pursues 30, 17 ICPI Report 16 (3d Issue 1990); Staged Auto Accident Defrauder Sentenced to
One Year: $84,605 Restitution Ordered, supra note 33; Staged Auto Accident Ring Convicted in
Chicago, 17 ICPI Report 1 (4th Issue 1990); Staged Auto Accident Ring Sentenced in
Baltimore: $147,854 Restitution Ordered, supra note 38; 31 Indicted for Roles in Staged Auto
Accident Ring: Orange County's Largest Insurance Scam, 17 ICPI Report 16 (3d Issue 1990);
37 Indicted in Chicago - "Operation Crystal Ball", 17 ICPI Report 15 (3d Issue 1990); Three
Oregon Men Indicted for $115,000 Rip-Off, 17 ICPI Report 12 (4th Issue 1990); Two Cleveland
Men Indicted for $22G Caused Accident Fraud Scheme, supra note 128.
132. The Regional Index Bureau is a service to which many insurance companies subscribe.
133. Other helpful, national sources of information and investigative skills include the
National Automobile Theft Bureau (NATB) in Washington, D.C.; the Insurance Crime
19921
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:907
IV. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST FRAUD
A. Private and Legislative Responses to Automobile Insurance
Fraud
Would-be profiteers find many avenues to commit insurance
fraud. Some fraud schemes become huge, 3 4 while others involve only
the relatively small amount to cover a deductible. In response, most
insurers actively search for fraud,' 35 and some states pursue and pros-
ecute even the "petty" insurance defrauder. 3 6
The insurance industry has organized to fight fraud by establish-
ing groups such as the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute (ICPI),
the National Automobile Theft Bureau (NATB), and in-house "spe-
cial investigation units" (SIUs).137 Several states established govern-
mental departments to investigate and assist in the prosecution of
insurance fraud.' 38 Other states still need to create insurance fraud
Prevention Institute (ICPI) in Westport, Connecticut; and the Insurance Information Institute
in New York City. See supra note 76 (about ex post facto underwriting and the Cleveland
Index Bureau as well as the Property Loss Register). While some state governments also have
their own databases, the need for both private and governmental improvements remains.
Hoyt, supra note 24, at 313.
134. DeBenedictis, The Alliance, supra note 33; FB.I. Charges 170 In Car Insurance Fraud,
supra note 126; Personal Injury Attorneys and Five Others Indicted in $9 Million Racketeering
Scheme, supra note 33; Seven Arrested For Fraud, supra note 126; see Bulletin, 17 ICPI 11 (2d
Issue 1990) (reporting the indictments of 31 individuals in a California staged vehicular
accident ring and the indictments of 37 persons in Chicago as part of a continuing multi-
agency investigation of auto accident schemes); Campbell, supra note 24; DeBenedictis,
Accident Fraud Operation, supra note 33; Knowles, supra note 22; 31 Indicted for Roles in
Staged Auto Accident Ring: Orange County's Largest Insurance Scam, supra note 131; 37
Indicted in Chicago-"Operation Crystal Ball," supra note 131.
135. At the very least, insurers show an interest in deterring frauds that rise to a certain
threshold level of loss.
136. In New York, for instance, a first party claimant was convicted of grand larceny after
he filed a fallacious claim to receive less than $1,400 (after allowing for the deductible). People
v. Ferone, 526 N.Y.S.2d 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); see also, e.g., Cajun Auto Fraud Probe
Heats Up With Indictment of Eight, 17 ICPI Report 3 (4th Issue 1990) (noting the indictment
of four persons for receiving $1,875 via a staged auto accident scheme). Without an initial
report by the insurer, of course, states cannot pursue most fraud because they simply do not
know about it. Approximately 15% of the responding claims personnel wrote that small fraud
cases are not referred to governmental investigative authorities. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY,
supra note 4, app. D at 24; see infra Appendix, Table 12.
137. See supra note 133. One commentator notes that, although SIUs "are charged
primarily with investigating suspicious claims, they are beginning to devote more resources to
educating claims personnel." Hoyt, supra note 24, at 314.
138. Mazzuca, supra note 115. The states include: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 21.06.080(c)
(1991) (giving the insurance department broad powers to investigate any alleged violations,
such as claims fraud) & § 21.36.390(c) (1991) (stating that the insurance department's director
"shall investigate facts ... and shall refer ... to the appropriate prosecutor" insurance law
violations, which include claims fraud)); California (CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1872-1872.9 (West
1992) (created in 1978)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ch. 626.989 (1991) (created in 1976)); Georgia
(GA. CODE ANN. § 33-2-3 (1992) - providing the state insurance commissioner with broad
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bureaus.' 39 State officials and insurers hope that such units will focus
public attention on prevention, detection, and prosecution of fraud,
and thus deter this type of white collar crime.'II
Increasing frustration among insurers and investigators has
prompted them to seek stronger civil and criminal measures against
powers to create departments - a Fraud Unit, within the Insurance Commission's
Enforcement Division, was created in 1991, modelled after Florida's Fraud Division -
Telephone Interview with David Wilson, Fraud Investigator, Georgia Insurance
Commissioner (May 22, 1992)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 41-250 & 41-252 (1991) (created in
1980, now a two-person claims fraud bureau within the Department of Insurance -
Telephone Interview with Ralph Krom, Investigator, Idaho Department of Insurance) (May
18, 1992)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 679B.154-.155 (1991) (established in 1983)); New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-8 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (created in 1983)); New York (N.Y.
INS. LAW §§ 401-402 (McKinney 1985) (created in 1981)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-2-160 (1991) (in essence, granted investigative powers in 1945, but with insufficient
manpower to pursue much claims fraud-Telephone Interview with Eben Wallace, Chief
Investigator, Investigations Division, North Carolina Department of Insurance (May 19,
1992)); Ohio (established in 1985; created in a budget item; no special enabling statute-
Telephone Interview with John M. Dillon, Chief, Fraud Division, Ohio Dept of Insurance
(May 18, 1992)); Pennsylvania (part of the Enforcement Bureau at the Pennsylvania Insurance
Department, but claims fraud is not an emphasized area-Telephone Interview with David
Tressler, Investigator, Pennsylvania Department of Insurance (May 18, 1992)); and Texas
(TEX. INS. CODE art. 1.1OD (West 1992) (created in 1991). Ontario, Canada also has such a
bureau (Telephone Interview with Olivia Bertie, Investigations and Compliance Branch,
Ontario Insurance Commission (May 19, 1992)). See also Clarke, supra note 23, at 52 & 56;
Mazzuca, supra note 115. Only three states-California, Florida, and New York-have
granted arrest powers to their insurance fraud investigators. They are the most aggressive
states in pursuing insurance claims fraud (Telephone Interview with Aaron Mazen, supra note
25), although New Jersey fraud division personnel argue that their approach-stiff civil
penalties-is actually more effective. See infra notes 227-231 and accompanying text.
Some states without separate fraud units let their insurance departments investigate
alleged fraudulent claims. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 375.991 -.994 (Supp. 1991);
Telephone Interview with Aaron Mazen, supra note 25 (referring to other states, such as
Delaware, which sometimes informally investigate claims fraud). In several states such as
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and, to a lesser extent, Ohio, the emphasis remains on
investigating fraud by insurance agents, with very few resources devoted to investigation of
fraud by claimants. Id.; accord Telephone Interview with Eben Wallace, supra.
139. See, e.g., Easy to Suspect, Hard to Prove, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 26, 1990, at 22
(arguing that a Massachusetts fraud bureau would be instrumental in eliminating false claims);
Those Phony Injury Claims, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 6, 1990, at 8 (disputing whether the
estimated $400 million in savings to be produced by a proposed, industry-funded fraud bureau
would be passed on to consumers). Massachusetts now has an insurance fraud bureau. This
bureau, though, is privately funded and operated by Massachusetts insurers. There is no
requirement that insurers report to it, no proven track record of working with government to
obtain convictions, and no power to subpoena witnesses or documents. MASS. GEN. L. ch.
266, § 111lB (1992) (effective in 1991); telephone interview with James L. Bryant,
Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General (May 21, 1992).
140. At times the mere presence of a private or state anti-fraud unit seems to prevent fraud.
Zinkewicz, supra note 5 (referring to one insurer's practice of sending claimants a form letter
that states "as a matter of policy" the claim is submitted to the SIU; some 80% of such claims
are dropped).
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those who commit automobile insurance fraud.'41 Courts and legisla-
tures have rejected procedural shortcuts, such as polygraph tests in
lieu of thorough investigations. 142 Yet, that rejection does not under-
cut the clear trend toward vigorous and successful pursuit of insur-
ance claim miscreants and would-be defrauders. Prosecutors often
use the federal Mail Fraud statute to reach such claimants. 143 In
141. Burnette, supra note 25, at 43 (arguing that insurers finally "have begun to realize that
fraudulent claims can be aggressively and successfully defended"); Candisky & Yocum, supra
note 28 (quoting an insurer's chief fraud investigator, who said, "enough is enough" about the
practice of paying rather than investigating small, suspect car claims); Crepeau, supra note 24;
DeBenedictis, The Alliance, supra note 33; Fielkow & Eisenberg, Civil RICO: The Insurers
Fight Back, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 1-29 (1985); Ghezzi, supra note 24; Kress, Insurers as RICO
Plaintiffs: A Civil Remedy for Fraud, 16 THE BRIEF - A.B.A. SEC. TORT & INS. PRAC. 33
(Fall 1986); Thompson, supra note 33.
The Insurance Crime Prevention Institute is the leading anti-fraud organization in the
industry and counts just about every major insurer as a member. It states the following to be
its purpose: "to join with every property and casualty insurer in a partnership to combat
fraud, reduce its costs, and protect honest policyholders with the most concerted anti-fraud
effort possible." 18 ICPI Report 2 (1st Issue 1991).
Some, though, dispute the insurance industry's oft-stated readiness to confront fraud. Of
the claims personnel in Florida who responded to an open-ended question seeking the reasons
why insurers might not report automobile insurance fraud to that state's insurance fraud
division, over one-third said that insurers lack the internal resources-primarily money,
personnel, and time-properly to identify fraud, report it to the authorities, and otherwise
treat it. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24 (93 of the 255 with responses);
see infra Appendix, Table 12. Another twenty respondents, nearly 8% of those who expressed
an opinion, blamed adjuster apathy. Id. That opinion is especially interesting because most of
the respondents (60%) were themselves claims adjusters, and the rest presumably all had
claims adjusting experience as managers/supervisors. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note
4, app. D at 4, 18, 22.
Others also doubt that the government really has committed itself to fighting automobile
insurance fraud. Claims personnel frequently suggested the following reasons why insurers do
not refer fraud matters to governmental fraud investigators: (1) failure of the fraud division to
prosecute (29.41% of those responding); (2) inadequate legislation for the successful
prosecution and punishment of insurance fraud (13.73%); (3) lack of governmental resources
for successful investigation and prosecution of insurance fraud (11.76%); (4) inadequate
punishment of persons committing insurance fraud (7.84%); (5) a court system bias toward
the insureds, even those who defraud insurers (6.27%). Id., app. D at 24; see infra Appendix,
Table 12.
142. E.g., in Elder v. Coronet Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. 1990), the court held
that insurer Coronet's exclusive reliance on the results of a polygraph test in denying the
insured's automobile theft claim violates public policy and may constitute an actionable offense
under the state Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Likewise, the Illinois
Director of Insurance promulgated a rule barring an insurer from even "requesting" a
polygraph examination. 13 Ill. Reg. 1204, 1217 (eff. Jan. 11, 1989) (expanding ILL. ANN.
CODE tit. 50, § 919.60(d) (1989) to forbid insurers not just from requiring that insureds take
polygraph tests, but to outlaw insurers' non-mandatory requests for polygraphs). The rule was
upheld in court. See Coronet Ins. Co. v. Washburn, 558 N.E.2d 1307 (Ill. App. 1990).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (forbidding the use of United States Postal Service "to defraud
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises"); see, e.g., Nine Indicted in Memphis for $108G Staged Auto Accident Schemes:
Second Wave in Long-term Investigation, supra note 33; Staged Auto Accident Ring Sentenced
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addition, authorities have prosecuted large fraud rings under the fed-
eral Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute
(RICO),'" and insurers have proceeded as plaintiffs in civil RICO
cases. 145  Members of large-scale insurance fraud operations fre-
quently are involved in other illegal activities as well.146
Numerous states specifically consider insurance claims fraud a
crime. 147 Some statutes specifically provide that an insurer can
in Baltimore: $147,854 Restitution Ordered, supra note 38; Two Cleveland Men Indicted for
$22G Caused Accident Fraud Scheme, supra note 128.
144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). Prohibited activities are outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1988), and the criminal penalties and prosecution provision is at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). See
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (affirming unanimously a RICO conviction
arising from arson and a 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) order to pay $340,043.09 in fines-the amount of
ill-gotten insurance proceeds); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (landmark
decision holding that RICO is not limited to the criminal infiltration of legitimate enterprises
but also covers organizations whose actions are exclusively criminal; defendant, the leader of a
13-person criminal ring of drug traffickers, arsonists, bribers, and insurance defrauders, was
convicted for, inter alia, insurance claims fraud); United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141 (2d
Cir. 1984) (affirming six defendants' RICO convictions for a scheme to defraud automobile
insurance companies with false property damage claims); Knowles, supra note 22; Personal
Injury Attorneys and Five Others Indicted in $9 Million Racketeering Scheme, supra note 33;
Three Oregon Men Indicted for $115,000 Rip-Off, supra note 131.
About half of the states have their own RICO statutes, generally providing both criminal
and civil sanctions. See Note, Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Civil RICO Claims, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1047, 1075-76 n.226 (1988) (listing the states with "little RICO" statutes). Moreover,
civil suits under the federal RICO law may be brought in either federal or state court. Tafflin
v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (unanimous decision).
145. See, e.g., Burnette, supra note 25, at 47-48; DeBenedictis, The Alliance, supra note 33;
Fielkow & Eisenberg, supra note 141; Kress, supra note 141; Larry E. Parrish, RICO Civil
Remedies: An Untapped Resource for Insurers, 49 INS. COUNSEL J. 337 (1982); Thompson,
supra note 33; Howard Veisz & Marvin Wexler, Civil RICO: A Weapon Against Fraud, 86
BEST'S REVIEW, PROP. & CASUALTY ED. 22, Apr. 1986; Zinkewicz, supra note 5 (citing law
professor G. Robert Blakey's speech to the effect that RICO civil actions are the most valuable
means of fighting insurance fraud). A private cause of action under RICO is set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
Proposals to reduce the scope of civil actions under RICO have been supported by the
insurance industry but opposed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
Steven Brostoff, Civil RICO Suit Limits to be Debated in Congress, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
PROP. & CASUALTY, Mar. 6, 1989, at 2. Moreover, RICO has limits. For example, a court
held that a conspiracy by adjusters, appraisers, auto dealers, body shop operators, an insurance
company employee, and various claimants did not constitute a RICO civil conspiracy because
the insurer adduced no evidence that the defendants' joint, criminal enterprise made the
defrauded insurer's damages more than if the same actions had been done separately.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
146. See United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1984); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Plaza Oldsmobile, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. N.Y. 1985); United States v. Jacob, 502 F.
Supp. 1221 (D. Md. 1980); Eighteen Members of Organized Fraud Ring Indicted in Texas,
supra note 131. Certainly, smaller fraud operations may also involve other crimes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Giannetta, 711 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Me. 1989) (probationer involved both in
auto insurance fraud concerning stolen cars and in the sale of illegal drugs).
147. ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.360(b)(2)-(3) & 21.36.360(q) (1991); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 1871.1 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. ANN. STAT. § 53A-215 (1985 & Supp. 1992); DEL.
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recover damages, including attorney fees and investigative costs, from
claimants convicted of insurance fraud. 4 ' Moreover, a criminal con-
viction may estop the insured from relitigating the fraud issue in a
subsequent civil suit. 4 9
Relatively few states have enacted statutes specifically governing
the investigation and prosecution of insurance fraud. 5 ' These laws
establish governmental departments to handle the investigation of
suspected insurance fraud. The departments typically work hand in
hand with prosecutors to develop criminal cases. States with such
insurance fraud divisions generally require the insurance adjuster and
insurance company to report suspected fraud to the division."'5 Yet,
CODE ANN. tit. II, § 913 (1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ch. 817.234 (1991); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-1-9 (1991 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 41-1325 (1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
para. 1101 (1965 & Supp. 1992); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § IIlA- 111B (West Supp.
1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-401 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (both application and claims
fraud); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-23 (Michie 1988) (both application and claims fraud);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 176.00-.30 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-161 (1990); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-01-10 & 26.1-02-24.1 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2921.13(a)(10),
2921.13(D)(3) (1990 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1662 (West 1983); 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 474 (1971) (both application and claims fraud); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-18-1.1 (Supp.
1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-55-170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 58-33-37 (1990) (both application and claims fraud); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-133 (1991)
(theft); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521 (1990) (theft); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.395 (West 1982).
All of the above statutes cover claims fraud, while most do not mention fraud on applications.
A New York court specifically found that the state's criminal provision, N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 176.05 (McKinney 1988), only applies to fraud on commercial insurance applications, not to
personal policies. See People v. Ferone, 526 N.Y.S. 2d 973 (1988); see also supra notes 48 & 70
and accompanying text (discussing criminal law for fraud on applications).
148. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 817.234(5) (1991).
149. See, e.g., Morin v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 478 A.2d 964 (R.I. 1984). But see
Fisher v. Wainwright, 584 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding an insured's nolo contendere plea
to insurance fraud crimes inadmissible against the insured in a civil case).
150. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. One of the first states to enact such laws
was Florida. The initial Florida statute, 1976 Fla. Laws 266 (effective Oct. 1, 1976), created
the forerunner to the Division of Insurance Fraud and specifically provided that fraudulent
insurance claims constitute a third degree felony. These laws are now found at FLA. STAT. ch.
626.989 (1991) and FLA. STAT. ch. 817.234 (1991), respectively. There have been numerous
amendments. See, e.g., 1977 Fla. Laws 468; 1978 Fla. Laws 258; 1979 Fla. Laws 81; 1979
Laws 400; 1982 Laws 243; 1983 Laws 288; 1987 Laws 334; 1989 Laws 42; see also AUTO INS.
FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 146 n.102 (furnishing history of the Florida Division of
Insurance Fraud). In general, however, none of the states has had a sustained, legislative focus
on the problem of insurance claims fraud. Telephone Interview with Aaron Mazen, supra note
25. Insurance law reforms instead have centered on other issues such as medical malpractice,
rate structuring, no-fault insurance, and bad faith.
151. States with such requirements are: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.390(a) (1984));
California (CAL. INS. CODE § 1872.4 (West 1991)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ch. 626.989(6)
(1991)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 33-1-16(0 (1991)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 41-250 (1991));
Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 767.24(c) (1991) (concerning motor vehicle insurance));
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. L. ch. 266, § 11 IB(f) (1992) (reporting to a privately operated
investigation bureau about suspected auto insurance fraud)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.§ 65B.81 subd. 2 (1992) (concerning motor vehicle theft fraud)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT.
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the level of compliance is unclear. 5 2 A number of claims personnel
acknowledge that they, or at least adjusters generally, lack familiarity
with the requirements and procedures for reporting fraud to the
authorities.153 The new "get tough" attitude has increased the
number of prosecuted fraud cases, but still has not solved the prob-
lem. Small claims fraud often remains unnoticed or unreported'54
because of the overall cost of pursuing such fraud'55 or, at times,
because of adjuster apathy. 56 The problem of too few personnel, too
little time, and not enough money also contributes to a failure in
detection. 5 7
Many insurance companies have implemented in-house training
§ 375.992 (Vernon 1991)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-9(a) (1985)); New York
(N.Y. INS. LAW § 405 (McKinney 1985)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-163
(1990)); and Texas (TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.78(2)(b) (West 1992) (concerning automobile
insurance fraud only)). See also Clarke, supra note 23, at 52 & 56; Mazzuca, supra note 115.
152. In fact, neither the Florida Fraud Division nor prosecutors have ever proceeded
against agents, insurers, or others for failing to report under FLA. STAT. ch. 626.989(6) (1991).
Telephone Interview with Jon E. Crosby, then Director, Division of Insurance Fraud, Florida
Department of Insurance (Apr. 24, 1991) [hereinafter "Crosby Interview"]; Telephone
Interview with Frank Doolittle, Director, Division of Insurance Fraud, Florida Department of
Insurance (May 18, 1992) [hereinafter "Doolittle Interview"]. Indeed, no such alleged failure
has even been investigated. Crosby Interview; Doolittle Interview. According to Mr. Crosby,
no statutes or regulations provide a penalty for a ch. 626.989(6) failure to report except for the
administrative and misdemeanor sanctions generally provided under FLA. STAT. ch. 624.15
(1991).
The founder and former President of the International Association of Insurance Fraud
Agencies is unaware of any proceeding ever, anywhere, against a nonreporting insurer.
Telephone Interview with Aaron Mazen, Director of the New York Insurance Fraud Bureau,
supra note 25. New Jersey's fraud division, however, is starting to conduct random audits of
auto insurers to ascertain whether they actually report suspected fraud; punishment of the
nonreporting entities may prove necessary. Telephone Interviews with Richard Koch, Chief,
New Jersey Insurance Fraud Division (Jan. 30 & May 20, 1991; May 19, 1992); see infra note
229 (relating to New Jersey anti-fraud legislation in 1990, as well as to prospective regulations
thereunder).
153. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D, at 24 (24 out of 255 respondents,
9.41%); see infra Appendix, Table 12. In addition, four claims personnel-1.57%-said that
adjusters' "lack of knowledge" leads to a failure to report. Id. Perhaps claims personnel
working for insurers with SIUs need not be familiar with the state reporting requirements, so
long as they inform their SIUs of all cases of suspected fraud. Presumably, the SIU experts
know of the need to report to the pertinent authorities. Nonetheless, it is disquieting that some
claims personnel would not even know of such a fundamental state requirement.
154. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24 (38-14.9%--of 255 responses).
The responses assume that the fraud has been or, but for apathy, easily could have been
discovered. Over one-third of claims personnel stated that insufficient insurer resources cause
the failure to report fraud cases to the state insurance fraud division. AUTO INS. FRAUD
STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24 (93-36.47%--of 255 responses); supra note 141.
155. Id., app. D at 24 (40-15.69%--of 255 responses).
156. Id. (20-7.84%--of 255 responses); supra note 141.
157. For a complete summary of responses, see infra Appendix, Table 12.
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programs to teach adjusters how to spot fraud. 158 Organizations such
as the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute run industry-wide semi-
nars. Adjusters learn how to identify the indicators of fraud159 as well
as how to react to fraud. Some companies' Special Investigative Units
(SIUs) take over the investigation of claims once an adjuster suspects
fraud.160 Many insurer's SIUs, however, only handle claims exceed-
ing a certain amount.1 61  That practice necessarily overlooks an
unknown, perhaps substantial, number of small fraudulent claims, but
it presumably serves as some deterrent to more egregious attempts at
fraud.
In addition to requiring adjusters to report suspected fraud,162
many states also encourage adjusters and insurance companies to
notify the proper authorities by statutorily protecting them from an
accused's defamation claim or other civil actions. 163  In Pearce v.
158. See Ghezzi, supra note 24, at 521.
159. ICPI publishes a list of 93 indicators of auto insurance claims fraud which many
companies give to their adjusters to use as reference when handling claims. See AUTO INS.
FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 49-50, app. A at 10-15.
160. See ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL (SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
UNIT), SURVEYS ON INSURANCE COMPANY USE OF SIUs FOR FRAUD INVESTIGATION
(1984); see also Ghezzi, supra note 24, at 524-527. Of course, because cases go to the adjusters'
superiors, this specialization means that claims personnel may know little about the law or
actual practices.
161. The names of these insurers cannot be disclosed because would-be defrauders could
use knowledge of such confidential, informal thresholds to target particular insurance
companies and to structure their claims so as to avoid investigation. Telephone Interviews
with claims supervisors, regional officials, and other officials of insurance companies (June 22,
1990; Sept. 13, 1990, and Oct. 11, 1990). See, e.g., Ross, supra note 94, at 132 & n.24 (noting
that insurers will not give "official approval" to a policy of paying nuisance value for claims
below a certain threshold "for the convincing reason that such a policy, once known, would
perhaps be likely to stimulate both routine litigation and the presentation of unmeritorious
claims").
162. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
163. The state statutes are as follows (general immunity for reporting all types of suspected
insurance fraud, not just automobile insurance claims fraud, unless otherwise stated): ALASKA
STAT. §§ 21.36.365, 21.36.390(2) (1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2119 (1990); CAL. INS.
CODE §§ 1872.5, 1873.2, 1874.4 (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-1-127 (1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 533 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 626.989(4)(c) (1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-
16(d)(3) & 33-39-22 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 41-271(5) (1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para.
767.24(h) & 1102(4) (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3-22(b) (Burns Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2,119 (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-190 (Baldwin 1988); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22:1218 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2183 (1964); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
266, § 11IB(j) (1992); MINN. STAT. § 65B.81 subd. 5 (1992) (concerning only fraud about
automobile theft); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.993(2) (Vernon 1991); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 33-19-
408 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-3,133, 44-3,141 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 679B. 157
(1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:33A-9(b), 17:23-19 (1985 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. INS. LAW § 406
(McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-160 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-02-24.2
(1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3937.42(E) & 3999.31 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.685
(1989); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 474.1 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-1130(e) (Law. Co-op.
1976) (covering only automobile insurance fraud); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1.10D(6), 1.40(b-
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United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,' a former adjuster for U.S.F. &
G. filed a malicious prosecution action against the insurer after he was
acquitted of criminal charges stemming from U.S.F. & G.'s payment
of fraudulent auto insurance claims. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal of Florida interpreted a Florida statute as granting broad
immunity to the insurer and its employees when they report suspected
fraud to the state division in charge of investigating suspected insur-
ance fraud. The court barred Pearce's suit,' 65 noting that the immu-
nity statute shielded "specific persons" who perform required
reporting tasks from libel or other civil actions.' 66 In particular, the
court wrote:
We read this to mean any and all civil causes of action based upon
conduct under the statutory section.... It is unsound to say that
d) & 21.78(4) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-229(A), 38.2-618 (Michie 1950); WASH.
REV. CODE § 48.01.190 (Supp. 1991). These statutes generally resemble the model immunity
statute suggested by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). That
model statute broadly defines a "fraudulent insurance act" and then provides, in part, as
follows:
A. No person when acting without malice, fraudulent intent or bad faith, shall
be subject to liability by virtue of his filing reports, or furnishing, orally or in
writing, other information concerning suspected, anticipated or completed
fraudulent insurance acts, when such reports are provided to or received from:
(1) Law enforcement officials, their agents and employees; or (2) The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, the state Department of Insurance, a
federal or state governmental agency or bureau established to detect and prevent
fraudulent insurance acts, as well as any other organization established for the
same purpose, and their agents, employees or designees.
B. No person or entity identified in Subsection A or any of their employees or
agents when performing their authorized activities including the publication or
dissemination of any related bulletin or reports, without malice, fraudulent intent
or bad faith, shall be subject to civil liability for libel, slander, or any other
relevant tort, and no civil cause of action of any nature shall exist against such
persons.
MODEL IMMUNITY AcT § 2 (1990).
164. 476 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
165. Id. FLA. STAT. ch. 626.989(4)(c) (1991) states:
In the absence of fraud or bad faith, a person is not subject to civil liability for
libel, slander, or any other relevant tort by virtue of filing reports, without
malice, or furnishing other information, without malice, required by this section
or required by the department or division under the authority granted in this
section, and no civil cause of action of any nature shall arise against such person:
1. For any information relating to suspected fraudulent insurance acts
furnished to or received from law enforcement officials, their agents, or
employees;
2. For any information relating to suspected fraudulent insurance acts
furnished to or received from other persons subject to the provisions of this
chapter; or
3. For any such information furnished in reports to the department, division, or
the [NAIC].
166. 476 So. 2d at 752-53.
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only reports on the Division-prescribed form and subsequent pro-
vision of information are immune from civil prosecution, but that
information less formally communicated leaves an insurer or its
employees open to suit .... Nor is it reasonable to suppose that it
was the legislature's purpose to permit possible fraudulent claims
to go unpunished unless the Division created a form for reporting
suspected fraud and the insurer or its employee used that form to
make a report. ' 67
B. Concerns About Bad Faith
While immunity from civil actions should encourage the report-
ing of fraud, adjusters often have countervailing concerns. The delay
of payment on a valid claim because the adjuster suspects fraud can
expose both the company and the adjuster to bad faith lawsuits. A
Florida statute corresponding to other states' bad faith case law,1 68
reads as follows:
Any person may bring a civil action against an insurer when such
person is damaged... [b]y the commission of any of the following
acts by the insurer: 1. Not attempting in good faith to settle
claims when, under all the circumstances, it could and should have
done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured and
with due regard for his interests .... [A] person pursuing a rem-
edy under this section need not prove that such act was committed
or performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice.' 69
Adjusters thus worry about bad faith actions by insureds when-
167. Id. at 753.
168. A bad faith cause of action in third party cases "has received almost unanimous
acceptance throughout the United States." STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS:
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 2:22 (1990). The third party bringing such a suit may be an
injured driver or passenger to whom an insured owes bodily injury liability. This injured third
party has legally enforceable rights under the insurance contract; after obtaining a judgment
for his injuries, he becomes a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the tortfeasor and
that person's liability insurer. See Cardenas v. Miami-Dade Yellow Cab Co., 538 So. 2d 491,
495 (Fla. 3d DCA), review dismissed, 549 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1989); see also, e.g., Jefferson v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1401 (D. S.C. 1987); Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp.
1456 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parkinson, 487 N.E.2d 162 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
Thirty-five jurisdictions also recognize a cause of action for bad faith in first-party cases,
where the insured himself sues the insurance company. ASHLEY, supra.
These bad faith claims are not to be confused with the situations targeted by the unfair
claims settlement practices statutes. For a list of the types of misconduct usually barred by
such statutes, see MCCARTHY, supra note 43, at 526-30. For a complete list of the state laws
against unfair claims settlement practices and against unfair and deceptive acts generally, and
for state statutes specifically providing for the recovery of attorney's fees, damages or interest
in suits against insurers, see id. at 753-60.
169. FLA. STAT. ch. 624.155(l)(b) (1991).
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ever they delay the settlement of claims. Almost half of the claims
personnel participating in the study stated that fear of "bad faith"
actions influences their payment of questionable personal injury
claims, medical bills, uninsured motorist claims, or bodily injury costs
in a relatively large number (over twenty percent) of such questiona-
ble claims."' Defense attorneys are even more likely to believe that
"bad faith" fears influence insurers' decisions whether to pay ques-
tionable claims.171
This concern about bad faith suits thus weighs against reporting
possible fraud.172 Indeed, fear of such lawsuits occasionally may lead
insurers to pay some meritless claims.17 3 Not only may "bad faith"
worries forestall reporting of suspected automobile insurance fraud to
state investigators, 17 4 but also fears that the insurer will receive bad
publicity or be sued for defamation discourage claims personnel from
reporting fraud. 75  Of course, bad faith actions are not an immediate
threat to most insurers; underlying questions of coverage, liability,
amount, and other claims issues must be thoroughly resolved before a
claimant acquires the right to sue for bad faith. 7 6 Moreover, the
170. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 9, 20, 23 (Claims Personnel Survey,
Questions 20a & 20d); see infra Appendix, Tables 13-14.
171. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at 8-9, 19, 22 (Attorney Survey-
answers of defense attorneys, Questions 23a-d). Plaintiffs' lawyers find it improbable that fear
of bad faith factors in the insurers' decisions to pay questionable claims. Id. at 8-9, 30, 33
(Attorney Survey-answers of plaintiffs' attorneys, Questions 23a-d); see infra Appendix,
Tables 13-14.
172. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text about statutory requirements that
insurers report suspected fraud. The "cost-effectiveness" rationale against reporting suspected
fraud (AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24; supra notes 141 & 154 and
accompanying text), and the "fear of bad faith" rationale (AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra
note 4, app. D at 24; supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text), are joined by a fear of libel
and of bad publicity (AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24; infra note 175),
which could hurt sales of insurance policies. See Candisky & Yocum, supra note 28; Yocum &
Candisky, supra note 28; see also infra Appendix, Table 12.
173. Hoyt, supra note 24, at 312 n.3 (citing Barry Zalma, An Invitation to Fraud, BEST'S
REV., PROP./CASUALTY ED. 80-83 (Sept. 1987).
174. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24 (38-14.9%--of the 255 that
responded); see infra Appendix, Table 12.
175. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at 24 (16-6.27%-bad publicity;
17-6.67%-ibel or other defamation). The latter concern is surprising inasmuch as the
insurer should be protected from such suits by FLA. STAT. ch. 626.989(4)(c) (1991). See supra
notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
176. See Romano v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 834 F.2d 968 (11th Cir. 1987)
(applying Florida law) (holding that bad faith action for failure to settle an auto accident claim
would not ripen until completion of the underlying action's appellate process, even though
there had been a final judgment in excess of policy limits against the insured); Colonial Penn.
Ins. Co. v. Mayor, 538 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (ruling that insured's uninsured
motorist claim must first be resolved before she could bring a bad faith action against her
insurer).
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insurers' fears are generally exaggerated. The claimant's own bad
faith - his attempted fraud - effectively shields the insurer from the
claimant's claim of bad faith.1"7 Indeed, no reasonable investigation
of what ultimately is determined to be a wholly legitimate claim
should expose the insurer to bad faith liability.178 Neither mistakes
nor reasonable delays constitute bad faith, and the law permits a sin-
cere and prompt effort to substantiate questionable claims.'1 7 9 Never-
theless, studies indicate that some insurers have overreacted to the
threat of bad faith litigation.8 0
177. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822-23 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985). One article comments on this principle as follows:
[T]he equities shift noticeably in favor of the insurer who, in response to a
fraudulent claim, marshals its considerable resources to investigate and adjust a
claim made by the insured purely for the purpose of exploiting his/her/its rights
under the policy. Such facts certainly justify an award of compensatory-and
perhaps punitive-damages against the insured. This logic applies a fortiori in
the case where the insured, in addition to presenting a fraudulent claim (or
knowingly presenting a meritless claim), sues the insurer for compensatory and
punitive damages when the claim is denied. In this case, the insurer has not only
incurred the expense of investigating and adjusting the claim, but has suffered the
added exposure and expense of defending the frivolous bad-faith action. Here,
the insured's abuse of the bad-faith "lever" may well constitute a malicious
breach of its duty of good faith sufficient to form the basis for a punitive damages
award in favor of the insurer.
Patrick E. Shipstead & Scott S. Thomas, Comparative and Reverse Bad Faith: Insured's
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Affirmative Defense or Counter-
claim, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 215, 226 (1987). See generally Stephen S. Ashley, The Effect of the
Insured's Misconduct on the Insurer's Liability for Bad Faith, 2 BAD FAITH L. REP. 153
(1986); John F. Dobbyn, Is Good Faith in:Insurance Contracts a Two- Way Street?, 62 N.D. L.
REV. 355 (1986).
178. Douglas G. Hauser, John P. Ashworth & Marc D. Francis, Comparative Bad Faith:
The Two-Way Street Opens for Travel, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 367, 372 & n.39 (1987). Of course,
legislatures could help by providing specific time periods to respond to claims, including bad
faith allegations. Insurers would be free from liability when acting within this "safety time
zone."
179. Ashley, supra note 168, at § 5:04 (noting that "mere erroneous denial of benefits under
an insurance policy does not vest the insured with a cause of action for bad faith"); see, e.g.,
Harrison v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that
honest mistake in execution of an otherwise adequate investigation is not bad faith); see also
Sharpe v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 808 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1987); Othman v. Globe
Indem. Co., 759 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding insurer was not acting in bad faith
when it denied a claim because the insured refused to furnish documents or otherwise
cooperate); ASHLEY, supra note 168, at 5:06 (stating the common sense proposition that
insurers are not obliged to pay claims the instant they are presented, that insurers may take the
time necessary to determine whether claims are meritorious).
180. Hoyt, supra note 24, at 312-13 (citing a Jury Verdict Research, Inc. conclusion that
insurers often settle questionable claims for a much greater amount than warranted by the
probability of a claimant's success); see also Philip J. Hermann, Lawyer Urges Insurers to
Contest Bad Claims, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED.
400 (Sept. 19, 1986). Officials at some insurers proclaim that they refuse to allow the threat of
bad faith actions to deter them from investigating claims and withholding payment until
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While insurers' fears of bad faith suits are not well-grounded in
law, they may still be reasonable as practical concerns about the time
and expense of responding to bad faith allegations. Although bad
faith claims are difficult to prove, claimants can easily assert them.
Responding to "bad faith" allegations may entail excessive adminis-
trative costs. Settling some questionable claims rather than bothering
with bad faith litigation may thus save money. 81 This subject
requires further study as to: (1) the nature and scope of the insurer's
administrative costs of contending with bad faith issues; and (2) possi-
ble legislative or in-house (insurer) reforms to reduce such costs.1 8 2
C. Civil Suits
Insurers can bring civil RICO actions against insureds who make
fraudulent claims. 8 3  In response to bad faith allegations by the
insured, they may also file counterclaims for "reverse" bad faith8 4 or
for breach of contract. Insurers can further seek Rule 11 sanctions in
federal court 8 5 or comparable penalties under state rules of civil pro-
cedure against both the insured and the insured's attorney. 86 If a
court finds the insurance claimant's case to have been frivolous or
satisfied of a claim's legitimacy. Interviews with Gerald Attis, Divisional Superintendent,
State Farm Ins. Co., in Orlando, Florida (June 27, 1990) and by telephone (May 18, 1992)
(contending that State Farm has no concerns over bad faith when it investigates suspected
fraud).
181. Generally, the mere threat of litigation may deter parties from socially beneficial
choices or innovations. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 158-61 (1988). For insurers, the decision may be to pay frivolous claims
rather than to advance society's long-term interest in having insurers pay only legitimate
claims.
182. One possible reform looks as follows: Upon allegation of bad faith, insurers could file
a report with the state insurance department and request an initial assessment of the case. The
department's early feedback would inform the insurer whether a fraud defense appears to have
sufficient merit to avoid a bad faith judgment. Of course, these reports would need updating as
more information becomes available.
183. Supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
184. Supra note 177 and accompanying text.
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Burnette, supra note 25, at 43-44 (describing the potential use
of Rule 11 as a countermeasure against insurance fraud); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 234-35 (1988) (finding that from 1983 through 1987 there
were 47 published cases involving a Rule 11 motion against a personal injury plaintiff, with 28
resulting in a Rule 11 sanction or warning). The overwhelming majority of sanction motions
are against plaintiffs' lawyers, and they are granted more frequently (approximately 60%) than
those against defense counsel (approximately 50%). Id. Note that Professor Vairo's study did
not consider unpublished decisions, which far outnumber published holdings. See Melissa L.
Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule
11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 388 n.25 (1990) (noting that about two-thirds of Rule 11
decisions in the Third Circuit in 1987 were unpublished).
186. See, e.g., MD. R. P. 1-341 (awarding costs, including attorney fees, for actions brought,
maintained, or defended in bad faith or without substantial justification).
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malicious, it may even order the claimant to reimburse the insurer for
attorney's fees.' 87  In cases where claimants assert fraudulently
inflated or entirely false claims in court, insurers can also use offers of
judgment to obtain some reimbursement of costs, perhaps even attor-
ney fees, if an eventual verdict effectively endorses what the insurer
offered rather than what the claimant sought."'8 As an alternative to
waiting indefinitely for insureds to pursue denied claims in court, the
insurer can seize the initiative by refusing to pay apparently fraudu-
lent claims and then seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurer
has no liability.189
For the study, insurers' counsel were asked a series of questions
about the decision making process for lawsuits brought by insurers
against alleged insurance defrauders. After all, these attorneys effec-
tively control whether most suits are filed. Their collective conclu-
sions were as follows:
1. They were somewhat more likely than not to consider the
financial cost a significant factor against filing suit. 190 The
time and aggravation of litigation, as well as pretrial discov-
ery expenses, usually were considered only minor negative
factors against suing alleged defrauders.' 9' The wide latitude
of discovery was seen as even less of a deterrent against a
lawsuit. 192
2. The difficulty of detecting fraud is the most important reason
187. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-102 (West 1989) (general statute applicable
in any type of civil action); FLA. STAT. ch. 57.105 (1991) (general statute applicable in any
type of civil action); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-6-11 (Supp. 1991) (about contracts generally);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-106 (1989) (statute specifically concerning insurance policy claims).
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 68. Many states have such rules as well. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-17-202 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 45.061 (1991). Some states even have a
rule directed specifically at tort cases usually covered by insurance. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
768.79 (1991).
189. That course of action relies on the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-02 (1988). States also permit such actions.
Courts, however, have dismissed declaratory judgment actions filed by insurers who
denied a claim. See, e.g., Casualty Indem. Exch. v. High Croft Enterprises, Inc., 714 F. Supp.
1190 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (dismissing insurer's declaratory judgment action as mere "procedural
fencing"-an attempt to accomplish a "backdoor" removal from state to federal court); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 118 F.R.D. 426 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (dismissing insurer's
action, filed three days before denial of claim was sent to client, as tactical device whose use in
these circumstances would promote disorderly race to the courthouse and discourage
"prelitigation" settlement of disputes).
190. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. F at 8, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey,
Question 19a).
191. Id. (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Questions 19b-c). Note, though, that a sizeable
minority, over 40% of responding counsel, found these factors to be a significant hindrance.
192. Id., app. F at 9, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 19d) (about two-thirds of
the respondents considered it as having either little or no effect).
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not to file a suit. 193 Judgment-proof insureds' 94 and the
potential for "bad faith" or similar awards are additional,
very important factors against seeking the help of courts. 195
The uncertainty of jury verdicts also weighs heavily against
filing suit. 96 The insurer's desire to maintain good public
relations and the presumed anti-insurer bias of most jurors
are considered less significant. 19
These answers may explain why all groups, including plaintiffs'
attorneys, tend to agree that the insurer's ability to countersue rarely
affects the insurer's decision for or against paying a claim. 198 They
also show that a potential action against the would-be defrauder for
his bad faith toward the insurer does not play a significant role. 199 In
193. Id., app. F at 11, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 19j) (38 of 43 respondents
considered it, at the very least, a significant factor. Most stated that it translates into a direct,
substantial cut in the number of insurer lawsuits against insureds). When asked for comments
about insurer lawsuits, more (four) comments were directed solely at this point than any other
factor. (Fourteen of the 45 respondents wrote comments.) Id., app. F at 11, 30 (Insurers'
Counsel Survey, Question 19k).
194. Id., app. F at 10, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 19h) (fifty-five percent
stated that judgment-proof status substantially cuts the number of insurer lawsuits; about 27%
said the reduction is at least one-half; only one out of four respondents considered judgment-
proof status as only a minor factor inhibiting insurer lawsuits).
195. Id., app. F at 9, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question .19e) (thirty-four of 43
respondents found the potential for "bad faith" actions a significant factor against insurers'
filing suits). When asked for additional comments about insurer lawsuits, two respondents
again mentioned the concern about "bad faith" litigation as "overwhelming consideration"
against filing a lawsuit. Id., app. F at 11, 30 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 19k)
(fourteen of the 45 respondents wrote comments). Another respondent wrote that the
elimination of punitive damages against insurers would lead to the litigation of many more
suspected fraud cases, and another opined that large plaintiff's attorney fees awarded in some
cases tend to dissuade insurers from fighting questionable personal injury protection cases. Id.
196. Id., app. F at 9, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 190 (twenty-one of 43
respondents considered it a significant factor, with ten others concluding that it was very
significant). When asked for additional comments about insurer lawsuits, two wrote about the
unpredictability of juries. Id., app. F at 11, 30 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 19k)
(fourteen of the 45 respondents wrote something).
197. Id., app. F at 10, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Questions l9g & 19i). These
factors were each considered slightly less important than the overall financial costs. Id., app. F
at 8, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Question 19a); supra note 190 and accompanying text.
A majority of the respondents, however, still viewed each of these three factors-money,
public relations, and juror bias-as a significant inhibitor of insurer lawsuits. Id., app. F at 8,
10, 24, 29 (Insurers' Counsel Survey, Questions 19a, 19g & 19i).
198. Id., app. C at 9, 19, 22, 30, 33, app. D at 10, 20, 23, app. F at 12, 25, 29 (Attorney
Survey, Question 24; Claims Personnel Survey, Question 21; Insurers' Counsel Survey,
Question 21).
199. Ashley, supra note 168, § 6:14 (stating, "one should not expect ... that courts will
apply the rules of bad faith mechanically and necessarily hold an insured liable for bad faith if
it engages in conduct that would give rise to a cause of action for bad faith if engaged in by an
insurer"). See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of N. Am. v. Moore, 783 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the insurer may not recover attorneys' fees after a showing of insured's bad
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conclusion, civil countersuits are ineffective weapons for insurers
combatting fraud. We shall next consider whether criminal counter-
measures fare better.
D. State Investigation and Prosecution
In recent years, many states have created insurance fraud units,
and existing units have grown tremendously.2 °° For example, one of
the most sophisticated state offices for insurance fraud investigation,
the Florida Division of Insurance Fraud, has grown substantially in
terms of number of investigators,2°' field offices,2 02 and cases.2° 3 The
Division is increasingly targeting small-dollar cases,2° which many
insurers fail to investigate privately because of supposed cost-ineffi-
ciency. The Division's former director confirmed that his office "nec-
essarily prioritize[s] matters involving large dollar amounts, multiple
offenders, repeat offenders, and multiple victims"; however, he said,
the Division refuses to overlook lesser violations or otherwise allow
insureds who make fraudulent claims to believe that by stealing fewer
dollars "they can slip through the cracks" and avoid prosecution.20 5
The Division thus investigates most case referrals presenting any evi-
dence of fraud.2 °6 Moreover, because Florida law specifically requires
only the submission of a false claim (rather than payment on it) to
establish a third-degree felony,207 the Division will not drop an inves-
faith). But see Handel v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 237 Cal. Rptr. 667 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (suggesting that the insurer might have a bad faith cause of action against an insured
who tries to commit insurance fraud; the court, however, overturned a jury verdict granting an
insurer substantial compensatory and punitive damages on its counterclaim alleging the
insured's bad faith); Habiheh v. West Am. Ins. Co., No. 144,606 (Riverside County Super. Ct.,
Cal., 1985) (finding for insurer on "reverse bad faith" cross-complaint against insured for
about $75,000), described in Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 177, at 225 n.71.
200. Supra notes 138, 150-151 and accompanying text.
201. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 155-56 n.137.
202. Id. at 156 n.138.
203. Id. at 156 n.139.
204. Mazzuca, supra note 115.
205. Jon E. Crosby, Insurance Fraud - Focusing Our Resources, FLORIDA UNDERWRITER,
May 1990, at 14, 46.
206. Id. Perhaps the greatest dichotomy between Fraud Division practices as pronounced
by the director and as viewed by claims personnel appeared when almost 30% of the claims
experts explaining why cases are not referred to the Division opined that the Division does not
adequately pursue matters referred to it. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at
24 (75 of 255 responses); infra Appendix, Table 12.
207. FLA. STAT. § 817.234(1) (1991). See Cox v. State, 443 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA
1983), discussed supra notes 36 & 98; see also CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.1 (West Supp. 1992)
(stating that it is a crime to knowingly present fraudulent claims; there is no requirement for
payment to have been made); IDAHO CODE § 41-1325 (1991) (presentation of the false claim
constitutes a crucial element of the crime; payment does not).
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tigation simply because the claimant withdraws a claim.2"'
Still, Florida and other states have only qualified success in fight-
ing insurance fraud. During the past decade, Florida has made sub-
stantial progress in detecting and prosecuting insurance crimes.2"
But judged by present estimates of actual fraud, rather than by past
prosecutions, the picture remains bleak. Insurance fraud arrests and
convictions occur in only an insignificant percentage of the presumed
instances of automobile insurance fraud.21 0
The most frequently stated reason for states' failure to pursue
suspected insurance fraud cases is lack of sufficient evidence. Insur-
ance personnel most often mention this same problem as a reason for
not reporting suspected fraud to the government to begin with;211 gov-
ernmental investigators 212 and prosecutors213 alike name it more fre-
quently than any other reason when justifying lack of prosecution.
Indeed, the ICPI finds that only one in eight referrals has sufficient
evidence to merit prosecutorial review. 214 The government ends up
bringing charges in about seventy to seventy-five percent of the cases
ICPI recommends for prosecution.213
Few prosecutors have much experience handling automobile
insurance fraud cases.216 In many of Florida's twenty judicial cir-
208. Robin Yocum & Catherine Candisky, Ohio Laws Hinder Fight Against Fraud,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1988, at IA, 2A (quoting Jon E. Crosby, then director of
Florida's Division of Insurance Fraud). Cf. note 98 and accompanying text. The distinction
between failed and successful attempts to obtain claim payments may still be crucial in other
jurisdictions' investigative and prosecutorial decisions. For instance, Ohio has no law against
mere attempts, Yocum & Candisky, supra, and the New Jersey fraud division focuses on
obtaining civil damage awards, infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text. Obviously, given
limited public resources, it makes some sense to focus on "successful" fraud rather than
attempted fraud cases in which the damages are most likely comparatively small.
209. For a brief account of Florida's improvements, see AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra
note 4, at 157-58.
210. Id. at 158. Florida Fraud Division opinions about why an insurer might not refer
fraud cases are found id. at 159.
211. Id., app. D at 24 (106-41.57%--of the 255 responses); see infra Appendix, Table 12.
212. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. E at 4, 16 (Fraud Division Survey,
Question 6). For the investigators' perceptions of problems at the prosecutorial level, see id. at
160.
213. Id. at 163 & n.178.
214. INSURANCE CRIME PREVENTION INST., supra note 34, at 16 (figures from July 1,
1987, to June 30, 1990).
215. Id. at 17 (figures from July 1, 1987, to June 30, 1990).
216. Telephone Interview with Chet Zerlin, Deputy Chief, Economic Crimes Unit, Dade
County, Florida, State's Attorney Office (May 19, 1992) [hereinafter Zerlin Interview];
Telephone Interviews with Kent Neil, Chief of Economic Crimes Unit, 17th Judicial Circuit,
Broward County, Florida, State's Attorney Office (Feb. 16 & 27, 1990; May 19, 1992)
[hereinafter Neil Interviews]; Telephone Interview with Carole Rice, Assistant State's
Attorney, 5th Judicial Circuit - Ocala, Florida (Feb. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Rice Interview].
For instance, none of the prosecutors responding to the survey had spent more than 20 percent
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cuits, for example, no prosecutor has had any auto claims fraud
cases.2 17 Only a few circuits, in large metropolitan areas, have several
prosecutors experienced in auto insurance fraud. Presumably, this
problem exists in most states.218
Prosecutorial disinterest exacerbates the problem of inexperi-
ence. As one prosecutor put it:
Most Assistant State Attorneys either aren't interested in prosecut-
ing white collar cases or just not knowledgable [sic] enough to file
said charges. So if an investigator has trouble finding someone to
file his case, he would be reluctant to [send it on for prosecution].
It depends on the Judicial Circuit.21 9
Prosecutors find that time constraints, budget and personnel
shortages, poor case preparation by law enforcement or fraud division
investigators, and poorly drafted fraud laws and sentencing guidelines
create other stumbling blocks.220 Prosecutors acknowledge that they
prefer the prosecution of "street crimes" to white collar crimes; they
may not understand "paper" crimes, and do not have the time to
learn.221 In offices with well-established economic crime units, how-
ever, prosecutors rarely drop charges.222
Most prosecutors and insurance fraud investigators agree that
jail time is the most appropriate punishment for insurance fraud
criminals who are "repeat" offenders, followed by restitution, fines,
probation, and community service.223 Most states' insurance fraud
laws provide prison terms, albeit relatively short ones. In many
states, however, prosecutors have great difficulty securing a prison
of his or her time on automobile insurance claims fraud; most had handled no more than a
total of nine such cases in recent years. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. G at 3,
12, 15 (Prosecutor Survey, Questions 4-5).
217. Neil Interviews, supra note 216; Rice interview, supra note 216.
218. Telephone Interviews with Richard Koch, supra note 152.
219. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. G at 4, 16 (Prosecutor Survey, Question
7). Noting the difficulty in getting prosecutors to respond to insurance fraud, Notre Dame
Law professor G. Robert Blakey put it as follows: "If I go to a prosecutor to ask him to
pursue an action, often the response is 'Listen, I've got a drug problem in my state-rapes,
robberies, murders. You want me to spend time on a case where somebody cheated an
insurance company? Isn't that what insurance companies are for?'" Zinkewicz, supra note 5.
Speaking more generally about law enforcement officers, a respondent wrote, "[n]ot one
... in fifty [is] aware of what constitutes insurance fraud and of the congruent issues." AUTO
INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. E at 11, 19 (Fraud Division Survey, Additional
Comments at End of Survey).
220. Id., app. G at 4, 16 (Prosecutor Survey, Question 8); Neil Interviews, supra note 216;
Rice Interview, supra note 216; Zerlin Interview, supra note 216.
221. Rice Interview, supra note 216.
222. Neil and Zerlin Interviews, supra note 216.
223. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. E at 5, 12-13, 15; app. G at 5, 12-13
(Fraud Division Survey, Question 10; Prosecutor Survey, Question 11).
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term forfirst-time insurance fraud offenders.224 Prosecutors find resti-
tution the most important punishment for a first-time offense, with
jail time ranked second, followed by probation, fines, and community
service. 2  The views of fraud division investigators are similar,
except that they place fines and other assessments higher, about equal
to jail time in importance.226
New Jersey takes a different approach. It mostly relies on
administrative penalties focussed on restitution227 and on civil penal-
ties of $5,000 or greater.228 This approach may make more sense than
emphasizing criminal investigations. It avoids the problems of high
burdens of proof and of funneling violators into already-glutted penal
systems. New Jersey's approach requires direct cooperation between
defrauded insurers and the state, particularly in actions where the lat-
ter seeks civil fines and the former pursues compensatory damages
such as investigation expenses, costs of suit, attorney fees, and possi-
bly treble damages. 229 Richard Koch, the director of the New Jersey
fraud division, emphasized that New Jersey's civil penalty scheme
warns would-be defrauders that they can be hit "where it counts": in
224. One prosecutor wrote, "[i]t requires about 43 third degree felony counts for a
defendant with no previous record to score a prison term." Id., app. G at 5, 17 (Prosecutor
Survey, Question 9). Fraud Division respondents also wanted sentencing guidelines which
would provide some jail time as well as other increases in punishment. Id., app. E at 8, 17
(Fraud Division Survey, Question 8).
225. Id., app. G at 5, 12, 15 (Prosecutor Survey, Question 10).
226. Id., app. E at 5, 12, 15 (Fraud Division Survey, Question 9).
227. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:33A-2, 17:33A-5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
228. Id. at §§ 17:33A-4, 17:33A-5.
229. Id. at § 17:33A-7. In 1990, the New Jersey legislature sought to improve cooperation
by requiring all automobile insurers to file with the state insurance commissioner "a plan for
the prevention of fraudulent insurance applications and claims and for the prevention of
automobile theft." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33B-46(a) (West Supp. 1991). Under the New
Jersey legislation the commissioner, calling upon the expertise of the state's Division of
Insurance Fraud Prevention, has 90 days to approve or disapprove the plan. Id. The
commissioner can request amendments and, ultimately, can impose a rather severe penalty-a
reduction of up to 20% in the automobile physical damage base rates-for insurers that fail to
submit a plan, fail to make requested amendments, or fail "to properly implement an approved
plan in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time period." Id. at § 17:33B-46(c).
Plan implementation is to be monitored by the state's Division of Insurance Fraud Prevention,
and each insurer must file an annual report "on its experience in implementing its fraud and
theft prevention plan." Id. at § 17:33B-46(b). Again, failure to file such reports may result in
a 20% reduction of physical damage base rates. Id. at § 17:33B-46(c).
State regulations and the individual insurers' plans have been completed and filed, and all
insurers must include in their plans a section ensuring compliance with the fraud reporting
requirements of New Jersey law. Id. at § 17:33A-9(a) (West 1985). Telephone Interviews with
Richard Koch, supra note 152. The failure to report thus will constitute a failure to implement
the plan and will give the state a right to penalize the insurer (20% rollback in physical
damage rates). Id. The Division is starting to monitor compliance with the reporting
requirement through random audits; while the 20% rollback should be sufficient, other
penalties also may be provided via future regulations. Id.
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the pocketbook. 231 Consistently imposed fines and complete restitu-
tion sanctions may have a deterrent value and a public education
effect lacking in less frequent criminal convictions, suspended jail
terms, and probation periods.23'
V. CONCLUSION
Insurance fraud is multifaceted. There is no single typical profile
of the fraudulent claimant. Fraud is committed by polished profes-
sional criminals and ordinary citizens. A single act of fraud may
involve millions of dollars or less than one hundred dollars. Increased
law enforcement may be the way to deter or catch professional
defrauders, but small-time fraud must be stopped by efforts within the
insurance industry.232
Erroneous statements about damage values or other "soft" repre-
sentations may qualify as opinion or as mere negotiating ploys, but
gross exaggerations may actually amount to unlawful misrepresenta-
tions.233 The fraud resulting from such misrepresentations often
escapes the attention of very busy claims personnel.234
Even if claims personnel do suspect fraud, they frequently choose
not to pursue their hunches.235 Some insurers, in effect, encourage
fraud by failing to file reports with governmental investigators or
230. Id. Of course, New Jersey's use of civil penalties does not preclude criminal
prosecutions. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-14 (1985). Realistically, though, the New Jersey
scheme means that only the most egregious or repetitive cases are likely to be pursued by
prosecutors; the governmental insurance-fraud experts emphasize restitution and civil fines.
Telephone Interviews with Richard Koch, supra note 152.
231. Id. Without dissent, prosecutors supported improving clearinghouse networks,
educating the public, raising the qualifications of insurance company fraud investigators,
increasing insurer civil actions against defrauders, raising registration requirements for
insurance agents, and - most of all - aggressively pursuing criminal remedies. AUTO INS.
FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. G at 6-8, 10, 13-15 (Prosecutor Survey, Questions 14a, 14d-
f, 14i-I & 14s). Governmental investigators essentially backed the same reforms. Id. at 161 &
n.168. Apart from creating the general benefits of fraud deterrence and detection, such
education may help in sensitizing potential future jurors to the extreme costs associated with
automobile insurance fraud. Rice Interview, supra note 216; AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra
note 4, app. G at 8, 17 (Prosecutor Survey, Question 14v).
232. See Ghezzi, supra note 24.
233. See supra note 7 (on exaggerations as misrepresentation); supra note 89 and
accompanying text (on exaggerations as negotiation). No-fault thresholds often encourage
such exaggerations. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
234. Supra note 154 (2d para.). Claims personnel often also believe that the government
lacks the resources to conduct an adequate investigation and prosecution. See infra Appendix,
Table 12 (11.76% of volunteered responses-30 out of 255).
235. The reasons may be, for instance, limits in time or financial resources, adjuster apathy,
concerns about a claimant's legal reprisal, and feelings that insurance crimes are not
adequately prosecuted or punished. Id.
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other law enforcement officials.236 In the end, lax sentencing guide-
lines and limited enforcement resources send the message that the
government neither vigorously prosecutes nor convincingly punishes
insurance fraud.
One erroneous perception widespread in the industry is that bad
faith laws stymie insurer anti-fraud efforts. 237 Another is the notion
that frequently governmental investigators improperly screen and
inadequately investigate or pursue cases.238
On balance, then, the areas with the most subjective quantifica-
tion of damages - uninsured motorist and bodily injury liability -
provide the greatest incentives for fraud.239 If a claimant is clever,
knowledgeable, and not greedy - either in the amount of claimed
damages or in the number of claims - he can almost count on com-
mitting fraud with impunity. To make matters worse, the incentives
for fraud are often created by the insurers themselves: choosing not
to pursue suspected fraud, opting not to report matters to governmen-
tal authorities. While the defrauders are truly the culpable parties,
insurers constitute the front line in the battle against auto insurance
fraud. It is clear that insurers could do more to discourage such
fraud. Governmental authorities can only buttress and supplement
the insurers' effort.
Unfortunately, the public's attitude towards insurance compa-
nies hinders insurance fraud prevention. Padding of estimates and
altering the facts of otherwise non-covered accidents are not widely
regarded as criminal activities. 2' Many policyholders believe they
deserve to get something tangible in return for their premium money
regardless of the contractual restraints under the policy and at law. 24'
Insurance claims personnel thus believe that education can help com-
bat automobile insurance fraud.242 The idea is that once consumers
236. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
237. The administrative costs and hassle of responding to bad faith allegations, though, may
outweigh this legal conclusion that bad faith actually is quite difficult to prove in court. See
supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
238. See infra Appendix, Table 12 (75 of 255 claims personnel respondents volunteered that
fraud division investigators fail to pursue cases, and 30 wrote that the division lacks the
necessary resources).
239. See, e.g., AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 40, 46 (compared with pay-outs
for other types of coverage, the claims payments in those two types of automobile insurance
coverage have the highest proportion caused by fraud: about 24% of bodily injury and 43% of
uninsured motorist payments, with other coverages ranging from around 6% to 18%).
240. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 78-79, 94, 98, 101 (survey of public
attitudes).
241. Id. at 103. Perhaps the claimant's rationalization is that she has paid premiums for
years without ever before filing a claim.
242. Id., app. D at 11-12, 20, 23 (Claims Personnel Survey, Questions 23d, 23f, 23g).
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see that they actually can save more money if fewer policyholders
inflate their claims, fewer fraudulent claims will be filed.243 Defense
and plaintiffs' attorneys, however, are skeptical about the effectiveness
of educating the public. 2"
Which measures, then, have the potential to reduce auto insur-
ance fraud? Based on the surveys' findings, as well as on the current
status of the law, the following recommendations are proposed:
1. Insurers' concerns over "bad faith" actions today causes the
payment of numerous questionable personal injury protection, medi-
cal payments, uninsured motorist, and bodily injury claims. Yet,
most statutes and case law do not support these concerns. If a plain-
tiff unfairly threatens a bad faith action, the insurer should respond by
filing a counterclaim, submitting a reasonable "offer of judgment,"
pursuing Rule 11 sanctions, seeking a declaratory judgment, forward-
ing (if relevant) materials to the appropriate law enforcement authori-
ties, or taking any other appropriate action. Insurers should also use
the remedies available under current law to defend against questiona-
ble claims. If necessary, they should file counterclaims, properly can-
cel policies, pursue and report fraud, or take other affirmative steps to
combat fraud and discourage future fraudulent acts.
2. Insurers must increase their efforts to settle legitimate claims
promptly and fairly. They must avoid precipitous actions in paying
or denying claims,245 and correct mistakes when they occur.
3. Whenever feasible, insurers should rely upon the clearing-
Attorneys, both for plaintiff and defense, are less sanguine about the usefulness of education on
auto insurance fraud and its costs. Id., app. C at 10, 11, 20, 23 (Attorney Survey, Questions
25d, 25f, 25g); see infra Appendix, Table 15.
243. Such an outcome may be unlikely. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 93
(noting that a publicity campaign actually may increase the likelihood of participation in
fraud); Interviews with Walter Dartland, Attorney and Executive Director, Citizens' Fraud
Prevention and Education Foundation, in Orlando, Florida (Jan. 5, June 27 & Nov. 2, 1990)
(noting that past anti-fraud, educational campaigns, such as one in California two decades ago,
actually have led to increased insurance fraud).
Another possible deterrent mechanism, as well as a prod to greater public involvement in
fighting fraud, would be a "fraud tips hotline." James E. Seymour, Fraud Not a Closet-Case,
FLA. UNDERWRITER, May 1990, at 14, 47; AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. D at
17, 28 (Claims Personnel Survey, Final Comments) (15 of 135 respondents mentioning an
education campaign, a reward system, or a hotline); id., app. C at 14, 36 (Attorney Survey
(answers of plaintiffs' attorneys) Question 25u) (four of 67 volunteered responses suggested
that the public should be educated and that there should be a fraud hotline). The NATB has
such a hotline, but it is only for fraud involving car theft.
244. Indeed, past studies have indicated that informing the public that a large proportion of
claims are fraudulent may boost the incidence of fraud. Some consumers interpret such
information as signifying that they should also be "getting in on the action," rather than
simply paying additional premium dollars for the fraud of others. See supra note 243.
245. Both defense and plaintiffs' attorneys mentioned precipitous actions by insurers either
in paying or denying claims. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, app. C at 27, 37-38.
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house networks.246 They should also take advantage of improvements
in prosecutorial knowledge about automobile insurance fraud and
about ways to fight it, and should further use arbitration. Because
plaintiffs traditionally prefer jury trials, they may need special incen-
tives to agree to arbitration.247 Tax incentives or other funding mech-
anisms may encourage better in-house training and may further
cooperation between insurers and law enforcement authorities.
4. Governmental bureaus exclusively concerned with the inves-
tigation of insurance fraud should be created in all states. States and
insurers need to allocate the required investigative and prosecutorial
resources. If properly managed, these resources, whether private or
public, will pay for themselves in prevention, restitution, and fines.24 8
Because experts in the field consider a law enforcement background
the most important qualification for fraud investigators, 249 and
because investigators have virtually all of the duties of other law-
enforcement officers, qualified investigators should have arrest pow-
ers. 250  Prosecutors need to develop expertise in economic crimes.
246. Examples of such clearinghouses are: (1) the Index System (or Central Index Bureau)
concerns bodily injury claims and is administered by the American Insurance Services Group,
Inc., a subsidiary of the American Insurance Association; (2) the Comprehensive Loss
Underwriting Exchange (CLUE) features the claims loss experience of over 200 insurers
representing more than 44% of the automobile insurance market; (3) a car theft information
system run by the NATB.
247. Some states have set up arbitration or mediation schemes in limited areas of coverage.
For example, a 1990 Florida statute permits either the insurer or the insurance claimant to
require mediation of any auto insurance property damage claim or of a personal injury claim
for no more than $10,000. FLA. STAT. ch. 627.745 (1991). The state also now requires
binding arbitration of disputes between the insurer and the insured's health care provider, if
that provider agreed to accept assignment of the insured's personal injury protection benefits.
Id. at ch. 627.736(5).
248. Telephone Interview with Richard Koch, supra note 152; see also Crosby, supra note
28 (noting that criminal sanctions, rather than civil measures, are often the most realistic
method of combatting insurance fraud).
249. That seems to be the near-unanimous opinion of both Florida's fraud division workers
and of its prosecutors. AUTO INS. FRAUD STUDY, supra note 4, at 161 & n. 169, app. E at 11,
14 (Fraud Division Survey, Question 14), and app. G at 11 & 14-15 (Prosecutor Survey,
Question 15). Claims personnel, insurers' counsel, defense attorneys, and plaintiffs' lawyers all
tended to rank law enforcement experience (investigative work) as the most important
qualification. Id. at 167 & 168 n.202. Only in California, Florida, and New York, though, do
the investigators have the same power as other police to make arrests, and only a few
additional states grant subpoena authority to the investigative division. Telephone Interview
with Aaron Mazen, supra note 25; see, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.994(1) (Vernon 1991)
(granting subpoena powers, but no arrest powers, to department investigators); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:33A-10 (1985) (granting only authority to subpoena).
250. Having insurance fraud specialists carry out most insurance fraud arrests enhances the
effectiveness of prosecution. During the course of an arrest, persons frequently wish to make
statements. If the arresting officers have familiarity with the particulars of the case, and
knowledge in that field generally, they will be able to follow up on admissions, to ask further
questions, and most importantly, to understand the significance of what the suspect has said or
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Those prosecutors with a general aptitude for and an interest in pur-
suing white-collar criminals should be offered career incentives to
pursue what many disparage as dull, non-violent cases.
5. Harsher criminal penalties for fraudulent claimants should
be provided for in sentencing guidelines, sought by prosecutors,
granted by judges, and administered by the correctional system. A
breakdown in any one area exacerbates the problem of fraud; defraud-
ers soon learn that they probably can escape detection and, at the very
worst, will suffer little if caught.251
6. States without adequate investigative and criminal justice
resources to combat insurance fraud should opt for a scheme such as
New Jersey's, and should focus on complete restitution for the fraud-
ulent payout as well as for investigative expenses, attorney fees, and
costs of suit.252 They should enact a statutory treble damages provi-
sion and give authorities the right to impose stiff civil penalties.
7. When insurers report suspected fraud, each case must be
acknowledged to the party forwarding the case. A statute or adminis-
trative rule should mandate quarterly status reports or other regular
updates for the referring party, as well as information about final dis-
position of the case.253 Prosecutors need to provide referring fraud
done. Crosby Interview, supra note 152; accord Doolittle Interview, supra note 152 (also
noting that fraud division arrest powers may speed up the process for detaining suspects and
reduce the chances that suspects can successfully flee the jurisdiction).
251. Hoyt, supra note 24 (noting that punishment must go beyond the mere return of the
fraudulent payout to have cognizable deterrent value).
252. The New Jersey approach is discussed supra notes 227-231 and accompanying text.
No other state has a similar statutory scheme or civil enforcement emphasis. Telephone
Interview with Aaron Mazen, supra note 25; Telephone Interviews with Richard Koch, supra
note 152.
253. Some states have laws requiring or recommending such reports. See, e.g., CAL. INS.
CODE § 1872.4(a) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that the fraud bureau will notify the insurer of
its findings); IDAHO CODE § 41-271(4) (1991) (stating that the reporting insurer has the right
to request and receive relevant, non-privileged information about a fraud division claims
investigation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-11 (West 1985) (declaring, "the [insurance]
commissioner may, in his discretion, make relevant papers, documents, reports, or evidence
available to . . . an insurance company or insurance claimant injured by a violation of this
act"); N.Y. INS. LAW § 405(c) (McKinney 1985) (requiring that the superintendent of
insurance, "where appropriate," report about violations of the law "to the person who
submitted the report of fraudulent activity"). The policy and procedure manual of Florida's
Insurance Fraud Division requires that a standard letter acknowledging receipt be sent to the
referring insurer. Telephone Interview with Gabriel Mazzeo, Attorney & Assistant Director,
Division of Insurance Fraud, Florida Department of Insurance (May 15, 1991); Doolittle
Interview, supra note 152 (noting that the Division now sends a more personalized
acknowledgment letter, geared, inter alia, toward the type and prima facie merits of a referral,
the estimated likelihood of prosecution, and the need, if any, for further information from the
insurer).
While the Florida Division, similar to divisions in other states, is protected from
subpoena-attempts by people seeking information on pending investigations, insurers are not
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offices and individual investigators with the same sort of reporting.254
Absent such reporting, insurers may conclude that their referrals have
been ignored 255 and choose not to refer future cases.
8. Insurers must not countenance "small dollar" fraud. There
should be no set cutoff below which insurers pay claims with little
question and never call SIUs into action.256 States must require that
insurers take strong measures to deter and detect fraud,257 and to
report suspected fraud to the authorities.258 States must furthermore
grant insurers and their personnel civil immunity for good faith com-
pliance reports to the authorities or to groups such as ICPI or the
NATB.2 59 Of course, enacting such laws is not, by itself, sufficient.
Insurers must change their internal procedures to actually meet this
reporting requirement.26" Insurers must recognize that referring mat-
ters to the authorities is a positive business choice involving little legal
risk,2 61 and that reporting creates a substantial chance of convicting a
fraudulent claimant. States should go as far as requiring insurers to
set up and effectuate anti-fraud plans.2 62 The state, by legislation, reg-
ulation, and enforcement, can see to it that insurers and the govern-
ment work together to prevent and prosecute fraud.
Of course, none of these suggestions individually will guarantee
fraud deterrence. In combination, however, they have the potential to
protected. The Division thus has practical reasons (in addition to confidentiality concerns, id.)
to withhold certain specific information from insurers in some ongoing cases. Nonetheless,
general updates could be provided, if only to let insurers know that the matter has not been
forgotten. Upon completion of a case, a final report is supposed to be sent to the insurer.
Telephone Interview with Gabriel Mazzeo, supra.
254. If the prosecutors do not directly inform insurers about cases, the fraud division or
state insurance department should continue to fulfill the reporting obligations to the referring
insurer. In California, if the district attorney does not prosecute within 60 days after receiving
a Bureau of Fraudulent Claims referral, the district attorney must inform both the bureau and
the insurer "as to the reasons for the lack of prosecution regarding the reported violations."
CAL. INS. CODE § 1872.4(a) (West Supp. 1992).
255. See infra Appendix, Table 12 (showing a large percentage of claims personnel believe
that the fraud division fails to pursue referred cases and does not communicate or cooperate
with insurers). Even if these perceptions are erroneous, the insurers' future actions -
deterrence, investigation, referrals - may be affected by those perceptions.
256. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 229 (on New Jersey's efforts to make insurers fight fraud).
258. See supra note 151-153 and accompanying text; supra note 229.
259. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. New Jersey has started to counter
insurers' inattentiveness or apathy by conducting random audits of insurers' files. Telephone
Interviews with Richard Koch, supra note 152. The goal is to ensure that insurance companies
take these reporting requirements seriously. See supra note 229.
261. That statement is true, of course, only for states with a civil immunity statute. See
supra note 163 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 229 for an example.
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remedy the various problems in detecting and fighting insurance
claims fraud. The goal is to give insurers the courage and ability to
confront suspected fraud,2 63 but also to pay quickly, perhaps even
generously, when claims are legitimate. Legislators must reform state
laws undermining either the planning or execution of reasonable pri-
vate investigations by insurers or the morale and effectiveness of state
investigators and prosecutors. Insurers must report all cases of sus-
pected insurance fraud.2 64 In addition to instituting penalties for non-
reporting,265 the legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts must
implement and strengthen rewards266 for the insurer and its personnel
who report suspected fraud.
263. Confronting suspected fraud is preferable to caving in to a short-term solution of
paying a smaller amount than fighting fraud would incur.
264. There are no significant efforts at the federal level to create a regulatory program to
deter, detect, and prosecute insurance claims fraud. Telephone Interview with Thomas
Goddard, Counsel for Government & Media Relations, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (May 18, 1992). The only current lobbying "push" is for federal laws against
insider fraud by directors, officers, brokers, or agents. Id.
For now, the arena for reform remains at the state level. Even well-established national
organizations such as ICPI are still "spread too thin" to effectively and comprehensively
compensate on a national level for inadequate state investigations and prosecutions.
Telephone Interview with Aaron Mazen, supra note 25.
265. Supra notes 152, 229 (New Jersey's approach).
266. E.g., civil immunity, required follow-up reports back to the insurer, heightened
opportunities for complete restitution.
INSURANCE CLAIMS FRAUD
APPENDIX
TABLE 1
In your opinion, what percentage of claimants who do not have
attorneys inflate their damages in cases involving uninsured motorist
or bodily injury liability?
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney Insurers' Counsel
Category Percent Percent Percent Percent
1 2.75% 8.12% 0.56% 4.44%
2 7.75% 13.68% 5.65% 13.33%
3 14.00% 17.52% 6.78% 17.78%
4 18.00% 11.97% 7.34% 4.44%
5 28.50% 20.51% 18.64% 38.89%
6 25.25% 14.96% 44.63% 13.33%
997 0.00% 1.71% 5.65% 2.22%
998 2.00% 11.11% 10.17% 11.11%
999 1.75% 0.43% 0.56% 4.44%
GRAPH 1
Percent
1 2 3 4 5 6 997 998 999
Response Category
W Claims Personnel M Defense Attorneys
M Plaintiff Attorneys Insurers' Counsel
Legend: 1 = 81 to 100%, 2 = 61 to 80%, 3 = 41 to 60%,4 = 21 to
40%, 5 = 11 to 20%, 6 = 0 to 10%, 997 = Do not understand
question, 998 = No response, 999 = Do not have adequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 3, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 6, Survey of Insurers' Counsel question 7.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
TABLE 2
In your opinion, what percentage of attorneys for claimants
inflate the claimants' damages in cases involving uninsured motorist
or bodily injury liability?
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney Insurers' Counsel
Category Percent Percent Percent Percent
1 53.25% 51.71% 10.73% 48.89%
2 28.50% 21.37% 7.23% 22.22%
3 9.25% 11.97% 5.65% 11.11%
4 3.50% 7.26% 8.47% 11.11%
5 2.00% 2.99% 15.82% 0.00%
6 0.00% 3.42% 48.59% 6.67%
997 0.00% 0.00% 1.13% 0.00%
998 1.75% 1.28% 2.26% 0.00%
999 1.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GRAPH 2
Percent
1 2 3 4 5 6 997 998 999
Response Category
Claims Personnel M Defense Attorneys
Plaintiff Attorneys Insurers' Counsel
Legend: 1 = 81 to 100%, 2 = 61 to 80%, 3 = 41 to 60%, 4 =21 to
40%, 5 = 11 to 20%, 6 = 0 to 10%, 997 = Do not understand
question, 998 = No response, 999 = Do not have adequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 4, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 7, Survey of Insurers' Counsel question 8.
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TABLE 3
In your opinion, what percentage of attorneys for claimants
inflate the claimants' damages in cases involving personal injury pro-
tection and medical payments?
Claims Personnel
Percent
38.75%
28.50%
11.75%
10.50%
5.00%
2.75%
0.50%
1.50%
0.75%
Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney
Percent Percent
23.93% 1.13%
18.38% 2.26%
10.68% 3.95%
14.10% 4.52%
12.82% 12.99%
16.67% 71.75%
0.85% 0.00%
2.56% 3.39%
0.00% 0.00%
Insurers' Counsel
Percent
42.22%
20.00%
17.78%
4.44%
11.11%
2.22%
0.00%
2.22%
0.00%
GRAPH 3
Percent
1 2 3 4 5 6 997 998 999
Response Category
- Claims Personnel M Defense Attorneys I
Plaintiff Attorneys Insurers' Counsel
Legend: 1 = 81 to 100%, 2 = 61 to 80%, 3 =41 to 60%, 4 = 21 to
40%, 5 = 11 to 20%, 6 = 0 to 10%, 997 = Do not understand
question, 998 = No response, 999 = Do not have adequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 13, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 16, Survey of Insurers' Counsel question 17.
Category
1
2
3
4
5
6
997
998
999
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TABLE '4
In your opinion, for cases involving personal injury protection
and medical payments, in what percentage of the cases do insurers
deflate the damages?
Claims Personnel
Category Percent
1 2.25%
2 4.00%
3 7.50%
4 7.25%
5 21.50%
6 54.00%
997 0.75%
998 1.50%
999 1.25%
Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney Insurers' Counsel
Percent
7.69%
8.97%
13.25%
8.12%
26.50%
32.05%
0.43%
2.99%
0.00%
Percent
21.47%
13.56%
14.69%
14.12%
14.12%
19.21%
0.00%
2.82%
0.00%
Percent
2.22%
4.44%
4.44%
8.89%
15.56%
64.44%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
GRAPH 4
Percent
1 2 3 4 6 6 997 998 999
Response Category
Claims Personnel Defense Attorneys I
SPlaintiff Attorneys - Insurers' Counsel
Legend: 1 = 81 to 100%, 2 = 61 to 80%, 3 = 41 to 60%, 4 = 21 to
40%, 5 = 11 to 20%, 6 = 0 to 10%, 997 = Do not understand
question, 998 = No response, 999 = Do not have adequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 14, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 17, Survey of Insurers' Counsel question 18.
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TABLE, 5
In your opinion, for cases involving uninsured motorist or bodily
injury liability, in what percentage of the cases do insurers deflate the
damages?
Claims Personnel
Percent
3.75%
8.00%
9.25%
9.25%
21.75%
43.75%
0.25%
2.25%
1.75%
Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney
Percent Percent
19.66% 60.45%
16.67% 15.25%
22.22% 8.47%
19.23% 4.52%
10.68% 2.82%
10.26% 6.21%
0.00% 0.00%
1.28% 2.26%
0.00% 0.00%
Insurers' Counsel
Percent
15.56%
6.67%
15.56%
11.11%
24.44%
26.67%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
GRAPH 5
Percent
0.2
0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 997 998 999
Response Category
W Claims Personnel M Defense Attorneys
= Plaintiff Attorneys - Insurers' Counsel
Legend: 1 = 81 to 100%, 2 = 61 to 80%, 3 = 41 to 60%, 4 = 21 to
40%, 5 = 11 to 20%, 6 = 0 to 10%, 997 = Do not understand
question, 998 = No response, 999 = Do not have adequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 5, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 8, Survey of Insurers' Counsel question 9.
Category
1
2
3
4
5
6
997
998
999
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TABLE 6
In your opinion, for cases involving collision and/or property
damage, in what percentage
damages?
Claims Personnel
of the cases do insurers deflate the
Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses
11
12
15
34
66
250
4
5
3
Percent
2.75%
3.00%
3.75%
8.50%
16.50%
62.50%
1.00%
1.25%
0.75%
Percent
Number of
Responses
32
34
38
27
42
40
7
14
0
GRAPH 6
Number of
Percent Responses
13.68% 68
14.53% 26
16.24% 21
11.54% 22
17.95% 14
17.09% 20
2.99% 2
5.98% 4
0.00% 0
Percent
38.42%
14.69%
11.68%
12.43%
7.91%
11.30%
1.13%
2.26%
0.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 997 998 999
Response Category
Claims Peraonnl M Defense Attorneys M Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 = 81 to 100%, 2 = 61 to 80%, 3 = 41 to 60%, 4 = 21 to
40%, 5 = 11 to 20%, 6 = 0 to 10%, 997 = Do not understand
question, 998 = No response, 999 = Do not have adequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 8, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 11.
Category
1
2
3
4
5
6
997
998
999
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1 ,
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TABLE 7
Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Understating of
Values, as opposed to misstatements of fact, are an acceptable negoti-
ating tactic to be used by the insurer with respect to collision and/or
property damage?
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney
Number of
Responses
21
63
60
77
8
0
5
0
GRAPH 7
Percent
8.97%
26.92%
25.64%
32.91%
3.42%
0.00%
2.14%
0.00%
Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses Percent
19 10.73%
46 25.99%
34 19.21%
71 40.11%
2 1.13%
0 0.00%
5 2.82%
0 0.00%
1 2 3 4 5 997 998 999
Response Category
Claims Personnel Defense Attorneys = Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Somewhat agree, 3 = Somewhat
disagree, 4 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Don't know, 997 = Do not
understand question, 998 = No response, 999 = Inadequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 17b, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 20b.
Category
1
2
3
4
5
997
998
999
Number of
Responses
33
59
65
229
9
0
4
1
Percent
8.25%
14.75%
16.25%
57.25%
2.25%
0.00%
1.00%
0.25%
Percent
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TABLE 8
Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Understating of
Values, as opposed to misstatements of fact, are an acceptable negoti-
ating tactic to be used by the insurer with respect to comprehensive
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney
Number of
Responses
19
58
71
72
9
0
5
0
GRAPH 8
Percent
8.12%
24.79%
30.34%
30.77%
3.85%
0.00%
2.14%
0.00%
Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses Percent
17 9.60%
32 18.08%
37 20.90%
74 41.81%
11 6.21%
0 0.00%
6 3.39%
0 0.00%
1 2 3 4 5 997 998 999
Response Category
Claims Personnel = Defense Attorneys M Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Somewhat agree, 3 = Somewhat
disagree, 4 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Don't know, 997 = Do not
understand question, 998 = No response, 999 = Inadequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 17c, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 20c.
coverage?
Category
1
2
3
4
5
997
998
999
Number of
Responses
32
54
67
232
12
0
3
0
Percent
8.00%
13.50%
16.75%
58.00%
3.00%
0.00%
0.75%
0.00%
Percent
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TABLE 9
Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Understating of
Values, as opposed to misstatements of fact, are an acceptable negoti-
ating tactic to be used by the insurer with respect to personal injury
protection and medical payments?
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney
Number of Number of Number of
Category Responses Percent Responses Percent Responses Percent
1 40 10.00% 18 7.69% 13 7.34%
2 55 13.75% 49 20.94% 28 15.82%
3 57 14.25% 68 29.06% 34 19.21%
4 229 57.25% 91 38.89% 95 53.67%
5 14 3.50% 3 1.28% 3 1.69%
997 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
998 4 1.00% 5 2.14% 4 2.26%
999 1 0.25% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
GRAPH 9
Percent
0.
0 . - ...............  .... ........................ ... 
0.4 -.....
0.3-
0.2
0.1
0
1 2 3 4 5 997 998 999
Response Category
=ImClaims Pesne o.,.fnse Attornes. DPli tf At torneys
Legend: 1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Somewhat agree, 3 = Somewhat
disagree, 4 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Don't know, 997 = Do not
understand question, 998 = No response, 999 = Inadequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 17d, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 20d.
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TABLE 10
Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Understating of
Values, as opposed to misstatements of fact, are an acceptable negoti-
ating tactic to be used by the insurer with respect to uninsured motor-
ist or bodily injury liability?
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney
Number of Number of
Responses Percent Responses
53 13.25% 53
92 23.00% 95
68 17.00% 43
166 41.50% 41
15 3.75% 0
0 0.00% 0
4 1.00% 2
2 0.50% 0
Percent
22.65%
40.60%
18.38%
17.52%
0.00%
0.00%
0.85%
0.00%
Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses Percent
49 27.68%
67 37.85%
19 10.73%
36 20.34%
2 1.13%
0 0.00%
4 2.26%
0 0.00%
GRAPH 10
Percent
1 2 3 .4 5 997 998 999
Response Category
=Claims Personnel M Defense Attorneys M Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Somewhat agree, 3 = Somewhat
disagree, 4 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Don't know, 997 = Do not
understand question, 998 = No response, 999 = Inadequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 17a, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 20a.
Category
1
2
3
4
5
997
998
999
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TABLE 11
Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Exaggerations as
to value are an acceptable negotiating tactic to be used by claimants or
their attorneys with respect to uninsured motorist or bodily injury
liability?
Category
1
2
3
4
5
997
998
999
Claims Personnel
Number of
Responses
123
108
40
113
13
0
1
2
Percent
30.75%
27.00%
10.00%
28.25%
3.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
Defense Attorney
Number of
Responses
68
97
31
36
0
0
2
0
GRAPH 1 1
Percent
29.06%
41.45%
13.25%
15.38%
0.00%
0.00%
0.85%
0.00%
Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses
54
69
20
29
3
0
2
0
Percent
30.51%
38.98%
11.30%
16.38%
1.69%
0.00%
1.13%
0.00%
Percent
1 2 3 4 5 997 998 999
Response Category
M Claims Personnel [ Defense Attorneys M Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Somewhat agree, 3 = Somewhat
disagree, 4 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Don't know, 997 = Do not
understand question, 998 = No response, 999 = Inadequate informa-
tion to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 15a, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 18a.
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TABLE 12
Claims Personnel Survey, Question 22. If you believe that insurance
fraud cases are not sent by the insurers to the Department of Insur-
ance Fraud Division, in your opinion, what would be the principal
reasons? (List the reasons in order of importance beginning with the
most important reason.)
255 out of 400 responded
Insufficient evidence for a successful prosecution 106
Lack of insurer resources 93
Lack of pursuit by Insurance Fraud Division 75
Overall costs 40
Ineffectiveness/small dollar amount of the fraud involved 38
Fears of bad faith 38
Inadequate legislation 35
Lack of fraud division resources 30
Lack of familiarity with referral procedures/requirements 24
Adjuster apathy 20
Punishment too weak 20
Lack of communication/cooperation between adjuster and Insurance Fraud 19
Division
Fear of libel action 17
Fear of bad publicity 16
Bias of judicial system towards insureds 16
Collusion between lawyer and chiropractor/physician 9
Inadequate media promotion 4
Adjusters' lack of knowledge 4
Unprofessional attorneys 4
Division process takes too long 2
Personal injury protection statute weighted against insurers 2
Attorneys for plaintiff mean we're unable to deal with claimant directly 1
Paperwork 1
Referral eliminates any claims settlement leverage 1
Claimants usually back off if charged with fraud 1
Public education needed I
Statute of limitations I
Physicians' peer review do not cooperate I
NOTE: On all surveys, the number of responses may exceed the number of
respondents because a respondent may furnish multiple answers.
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TABLE 13
In cases where fraud is suspected, how often is the allegation of
"bad faith" a factor in your (the insurer's) deciding to pay a question-
able claim involving uninsured motorist or bodily injury liability?
Claims Personnel
Number of
Responses
184
51
56
48
34
2
17
8
Percent
46.00%
12.75%
14.00%
12.00%
8.50%
0.50%
4.25%
2.00%
Defense Attorney
Number of
Responses
77
53
52
31
12
0
8
1
GRAPH 13
Percent
32.91%
22.65%
22.22%
13.25%
5.13%
0.00%
.3.42%
0.43%
Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses Percent
125 70.62%
15 8.47%
12 6.78%
1 0.56%
6 3.39%
6 3.39%
9 5.08%
3 1.69%
Percent
1 2 3 4 5 997 998 999
Response Category
Claims Personnel ,Defense Attorneys Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 =0to20%,2 =21 to40%,3 =41to60%,4= 61 to
80%, 5 = 81 to 100%, 997 = Do not understand question, 998 =
No response, 999 = Inadequate information to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 20a, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 23a.
Category
1
2
3
4
5
997
998
999
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TABLE 14
In cases where fraud is suspected, how often is the allegation of
"bad faith" a factor in your (the insurer's) deciding to pay a question-
able claim involving personal injury protection and medical
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney
Number of
Responses
102
49
35
21
12
2
12
1
GRAPH 14
Percent
43.59%
20.94%
14.96%
8.97%
5.13%
0.85%
5.13%
0.43%
Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses Percent
128 72.32%
6 3.39%
7 3.95%
8 4.52%
8 4.52%
7 3.95%
10 5.65%
3 1.69%
1 2 3 4 5 997 998 999
Response Category
Claims Personnel Defense Attorneys M Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 = 0to20%,2 = 21 to 40%,3 = 41 to60%,4 = 61to
80%, 5 = 81 to 100%, 997 = Do not understand question, 998 =
No response, 999 = Inadequate information to form an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 20d, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 23d.
payments
Category
1
2
3
4
5
997
998
999
Number of
Responses
190
49
54
36
45
3
15
8
Percent
47.50%
12.25%
13.50%
9.00%
11.25%
0.75%
3.75%
2.00%
Percent
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TABLE 15
In your opinion, how effective would educating the public about
the dollar cost of fraud be in reducing auto insurance fraud?
Claims Personnel Defense Attorney Plaintiff Attorney
Number of
Responses
171
146
69
13
0
0
1
0
Percent
42.75%
36.50%
17.25%
3.25%
0.00%
0.00%
0.25%
0.00%
Number of
Responses
37
91
69
28
7
0
2
0
GRAPH 15
Number of
Percent Responses
15.81% 14
38.89% 31
29.49% 71
11.97% 49
2.99% 10
0.00% 0
0.85% 2
0.00% 0
Percent
7.91%
17.51%
40.11%
27.68%
5.65%
0.00%
1.13%
0.00%
Percent
1 2 3 4 9 97 998 999
Response Category
M Claims Personnel M Defense Attorneys = Plaintiff Attorneys
Legend: 1 = Absolutely necessary, 2 = Very important, 3 = Impor-
tant, 4 = Not important, 5 = Don't know, 997 = Do not understand
question, 998 = No response, 999 = Inadequate information to form
an opinion.
Source: Survey of Claims Personnel question 23f, Survey of Private
Attorneys question 25f.
Category
1
2
3
4
5
997
998
999
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